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HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JURY 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.* 
Appellate harmless error review, an early twentieth-century innovation 
prompted by concerns of efficiency and finality, had been confined to 
nonconstitutional trial errors until forty years ago, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court extended the harmless error rule to trial errors of constitutional 
proportion.  Even as criminal procedural protections were expanded in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the harmless error rule operated to 
dilute the effect of many of these constitutional guarantees—the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial being no exception.  However, while a trade-
off between important process values and the Constitution’s protection of 
individual rights is inherent in the harmless error rule, recent applications 
of appellate harmless error review to certain Sixth Amendment errors have 
exceeded the scope of the initial compromise.  Highlighting the current 
trend of application of appellate harmless error review to jury verdicts 
based on fewer than all of the required elements of a charged offense, this 
Article warns that we are approaching the “point of no return” in the 
evolution of the jury in our constitutional democracy.  The Article 
maintains that the Supreme Court’s willingness to sacrifice individual 
criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment jury trial rights at the altar of 
efficiency and finality has subverted the constitutional function of the jury 
itself, and has undermined the jury’s institutional role.  The Article 
proposes a new theoretical grounding for the constitutional recognition of 
the jury’s core institutional interests—as distinct from the individual Sixth 
Amendment jury trial rights currently deemed expendable by the Court—
and advances a concrete proposal for the Supreme Court’s inclusion of 
certain jury-related constitutional errors in the category of those structural 
errors not susceptible to appellate harmless error review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom teaches that the last decade of U.S. Supreme Court 
criminal procedure jurisprudence has fortified the jury’s prestige 
considerably.  The line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 
for many, represents the renaissance of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
trial by jury.  However, even as the Supreme Court seemingly has affirmed 
 
 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases a sentence beyond a 
statutory maximum must be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); see also United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (extending Blakely reasoning to federal sentencing 
guidelines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (requiring juries, rather than 
judges, to find facts necessary to enhance a sentence within statutory guidelines). 
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the significance of the jury with its one hand, it has torn at the jury’s very 
foundation with its other, undermining both the constitutional role and 
institutional interests of the jury in profound ways.  Perhaps the most telling 
signal of the jury’s institutional erosion is the Court’s misguided application 
of the appellate harmless error rule to certain constitutional trial errors 
implicating the jury’s core fact-finding function. 
The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a criminal defendant a trial free 
from error.2  The doctrine of harmless error, which saves a flawed criminal 
conviction from reversal, generally permits a conviction to stand where the 
reviewing court believes the defect in the proceeding was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  A twentieth-century innovation prompted primarily by 
concerns of efficiency and finality, the harmless error rule applies to all trial 
errors, save for a narrow class of constitutional errors deemed to be 
structural.  A criminal conviction infected by structural error is immune to 
harmless error review and, therefore, is subject to automatic reversal.  
Conversely, if the constitutional error of which the criminal defendant 
complains is not deemed structural, the appellate court may both 
acknowledge the conviction was tainted with constitutional error and, at the 
same time, affirm the conviction. 
The Supreme Court has been sparing in its designation of errors as 
structural, thus far admitting only a handful of constitutional defects into 
the category of errors requiring automatic reversal.3  What remains in the 
vast number of errors that can be deemed harmless would surprise most 
casual observers; everything from Fourth Amendment violations to the 
erroneous admission of a coerced confession may be deemed harmless for 
purposes of appellate review of criminal convictions.4  One particularly 
troubling omission from the list of “unforgivable” structural errors is the 
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to all the elements of the charged 
offense. 
Imagine a scenario in which the government charges an individual with 
violation of a particular criminal statute containing three elements.  
However, the trial court instructs the jury on only two of those three 
 
 2. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution entitles a 
criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”); see also Dan Simon, A Third View of 
the Black Box:  Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 575 
(2004) (“While the right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right, the ideal, error-
free trial proves to be rather elusive in practice.”). 
 3. The U.S. Supreme Court thus far has recognized only bias of the trial judge, racial 
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, denial of the right to pro se representation, 
denial of the right to counsel and counsel of one’s choosing, denial of the right to a public 
trial, and defective reasonable doubt instructions as errors that cannot be harmless and 
necessarily must result in the reversal of a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563–65 (2006); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); 
see also infra Part I.C. 
 4. Persuasive arguments have been made for and against inclusion of such 
constitutional defects in the category of structural error. See generally, e.g., Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante:  The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced 
Confessions, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152 (1991). 
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elements.  The jury, which never was told that it had to find the third 
element in order to convict, returns a verdict of guilty.  The appeals court 
acknowledges that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on only two 
elements of the three-element offense, and that the flawed instruction and 
omitted elements verdict violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.  Nevertheless, the appeals court believes the evidence presented 
by the government at trial was such that the jury would have found the 
missing element beyond a reasonable doubt had it been so instructed.  
Therefore, the appeals court declares the constitutional error “harmless” 
and, although no fact-finder has determined that the particular element of 
the crime had been proven, affirms the conviction. 
The failure to instruct the jury on a basic element of the crime for which 
the defendant is standing trial, as depicted in the hypothetical above, would 
seem to compromise the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to such an 
extent that the conviction would be reversed per se.  This is particularly so 
in this era of “renewed respect” for the jury’s fact-finding role in criminal 
adjudication.  However, the Supreme Court quietly has made the 
aforementioned hypothetical a reality of our criminal procedure 
jurisprudence.  Rather than reversing a conviction that is based on a jury’s 
finding of fewer elements than are required by a statute, an appellate court 
may acknowledge the Sixth Amendment violation, yet, under harmless 
error review, opine on what the jury would have found with respect to the 
missing element or elements.  By engaging in what this Article terms “first-
guessing” of the jury’s verdict, an appellate court may allow a conviction to 
stand despite the fact that the jury—the fact-finder to which the defendant is 
entitled under the Sixth Amendment—has not found each element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
While the Supreme Court acknowledges that elemental omission errors 
violate the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, it deems the violation no 
more important than the myriad other constitutional errors that can be 
deemed nonprejudicial and overlooked on appellate harmless error review.  
Thus, the Supreme Court has shown its willingness to sacrifice important 
jury right principles at the altar of the efficiency and finality interests that 
the harmless error rule advances.  As a result, contrary arguments based 
upon respect for the individual Sixth Amendment rights of the criminal 
defendant have been doomed from the start. 
However, the Supreme Court’s application of harmless error review in 
such a scenario rests upon the premise that the only injury caused when a 
defendant is convicted by means of a verdict based upon fewer than all the 
elements of a crime is a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial.  To the contrary, as this Article argues, the application of 
harmless error review to these flawed verdicts works a different and more 
profound constitutional injury—to the jury and the very structure of the 
Constitution itself.  The Supreme Court has viewed this particular 
constitutional error through much too narrow a theoretical lens.  A broader 
examination reveals that appellate court first-guessing of juries not only 
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violates the Sixth Amendment jury trial right and fundamental notions of 
due process, but also offends constitutional structure by undermining the 
institutional interests of the jury. 
The jury, which has a constitutional function independent of its service as 
a vehicle for an individual’s Sixth Amendment rights, is frustrated in its 
structural and institutional role when a court assumes what it would have 
done had it been correctly instructed.  The willingness of the Supreme 
Court to permit such first-guessing of a jury’s verdict through harmless 
error review of elemental omissions is evidence of a profound lack of 
regard for the jury’s institutional existence, an existence that will be eroded 
beyond recognition unless the Court corrects course.  This Article proposes 
a shift from a rights-focused approach to an institution-focused approach to 
harmless constitutional error in the jury context.  Such a shift would 
necessitate that even if a court were inclined to lump the Sixth Amendment 
violation occasioned by elemental omissions in with the other 
“nonstructural” errors not subject to automatic reversal, it still would be 
obligated to remedy the institutional violence done to the jury itself.  This 
recognition of the institutional interests of the jury, therefore, requires the 
inclusion of elemental omissions in the category of those structural errors 
not subject to harmless error review.  In sum, if the jury is to retain any 
semblance of its intended constitutional function, appellate courts must 
respect the institutional interests of the jury, which cannot be further 
subordinated to the pragmatic values the harmless error rule advances. 
Part I of this Article briefly traces the development of the harmless error 
doctrine and the structural error carve-out.  Part II of the Article analyzes 
the recent jurisprudential trend in which harmless error review is being 
applied to elemental omissions and explains the Court’s flawed 
understanding of the nature and scope of the constitutional injury involved 
when an appellate court first-guesses the fact-finder on harmless error 
review.  Part III argues for the acknowledgement of the structural and 
institutional roles of the jury in the criminal process, illuminates the manner 
in which those roles are frustrated by appellate first-guessing of omitted 
elements in jury verdicts, and proposes a theoretical grounding for 
subjecting elemental omissions—and, for that matter, any error that wholly 
subverts the institutional role of the jury—to automatic reversal.  Part IV 
considers the consequences of expanding structural error to include 
elemental omissions, including normative implications for efficiency, 
fairness, finality, and public confidence in the administration of criminal 
justice. 
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I.  THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURAL ERROR 
A.  Development of the Harmless Error Rule in the United States 
A twentieth-century innovation in the United States,5 “[h]armless error is 
one of the most frequently discussed issues in criminal appeals.”6  Most 
accounts trace the history of the development of harmless error doctrine to 
the 1835 English case of Crease v. Barrett.7  In Crease, a civil case, the 
Court of the Exchequer “evinced its resolve not to invade the province of 
the jury,”8 and declined to find harmless the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence that was unlikely to change the result.9  Whatever the true intent 
of the Crease court,10 its 1835 ruling became the touchstone for the rule of 
automatic reversal that would reign in England for the next several 
decades.11 
In 1873, Parliament responded to the perceived hypertechnicality of an 
automatic reversal rule, and adopted the Judicature Act, which, in civil 
cases, decreed, “A new trial shall not be granted on the ground of 
misdirection or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless 
in the opinion of the Court to which the application is made some 
substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned in the 
trial . . . .”12  English judges, however, were not, as a general matter, 
inclined to assess the evidence and affirm verdicts infected with error.13  
Parliament, in 1907, persisted and passed the Criminal Appeal Act, which, 
inter alia, set out a harmless error rule:  “Provided that the court may, 
notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the appeal 
might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they 
considered that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually 
occurred.”14 
 
 5. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness:  Method and Madness in the 
Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 309, 314 
(2002) (“Harmless error doctrine is largely a creature of the twentieth century.”). 
 6. Simon, supra note 2, at 575.  Much of the attention given to the harmless error rule 
seems to have come from the past quarter century. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error:  
Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421, 421 (1980) (noting, in 1980, 
that the harmless error rule “has received comparatively little critical attention”). 
 7. 149 Eng. Rep. 1353. 
 8. See Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 6 (1970). 
 9. Crease, 149 Eng. Rep. at 1359. 
 10. See Traynor, supra note 8, at 6–8 (arguing that Crease was misinterpreted by later 
judicial opinions and did not stand for the fidelity to the rule of automatic reversal 
commonly attributed to it). 
 11. See Lester Bernhardt Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 190 (1939); see also 
John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record?  Harmless-Error Review of Conclusive 
Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 819, 822 & n.12 
(1994). 
 12. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, sched. 48 (Eng.). 
 13. See Traynor, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 14. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4 (Eng.); see also Traynor, supra note 
8, at 10–11; Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 501, 519 
(1998).  However, even despite the English double jeopardy bar, which well into the 1960s 
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Influenced by the same formalistic English judicial philosophy which 
compelled Parliament’s legislative response, the judicial climate in the 
United States in the nineteenth century was one in which “[a]ppellate courts 
in this country were wont to hold that an error raised a presumption of 
prejudice or called for automatic reversal, and they reversed judgments for 
the most trivial errors.”15  By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
American appellate judges “[i]n numerous decisions . . . had reversed hard-
won convictions because of only minor errors of procedure or form.”16  
Popular outcry gave way to reform efforts surrounding the automatic 
reversal rule.17 
Some of the most prominent members of the bar and legal academy were 
outspoken critics of the automatic reversal regime, and aided in efforts to 
prompt legislatures to alter the rule.18  One example of these efforts was the 
“Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to 
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation,” which boasted the 
membership of the likes of Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, and William 
H. Taft.19 
In 1919, Congress responded by amending the Judicial Code with section 
269,20 which was designed “to insure that trial verdicts were not lightly 
disturbed on appeal, especially under circumstances where the grounds for 
appeal were mere technical errors.”21  This legislation, now codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2111, provides, “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari 
in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record 
 
prohibited the ordering of a new trial, appellate judges were loathe to dismiss appeals where 
error had infected the trial. See Traynor, supra note 8, at 11. 
 15. Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1, 20 (1994) (quoting Traynor, supra note 8, at 13–14). 
 16. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless:  When Should Legal 
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167, 1174 (1995). 
 17. Chapel, supra note 14, at 522 (“Citizens became increasingly frustrated with 
appellate court reversals of criminal convictions.”); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The 
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1005–06 & n.56 (1973) (describing public 
reaction—and, sometimes, overreaction—to certain high-profile reversals of criminal 
convictions). 
 18. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 422–23 & n.15; see also David R. Dow & James 
Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 483, 486 & n.18.  
Partly as the result of concern in some quarters for the integrity of constitutional criminal 
protections, there was some resistance to the notion of applying the harmless error rule to 
criminal cases.  See Dow & Rytting, supra, at 486–87.  There was “a strong effort in the 
Congress to confine [the 1919 law] . . . to civil litigation, because of fear that the historic 
securities thrown around the citizen charged with crime might be too easily relaxed.” Id. at 
486 (citing 3B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 852 
(West 1982)). 
 19. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 422 n.15; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 759–60 & n.14 (1946). 
 20. See Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 892, 992; see also Orfield, supra note 11, at 195 (“Congress finally 
passed a [harmless error] statute . . . after considerable agitation.”). 
 21. Saltzburg, supra note 17, at 1006.  Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has pointed out 
that some states responded to the dissatisfaction with automatic reversal rules before 
Congress did. See id. at 1006 n.58 (citing Cal. Const. art. 6, § 4.5). 
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without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties.”22 
The federal harmless error legislation did not receive the attention or 
have the immediate impact reformers might have expected.  However, in 
the interwar period, appellate judges faced continued criticism regarding 
reversals for technical errors at trial,23 and the reformers continued to push 
for change.24  Just after World War II, their efforts were met with a measure 
of success.  As part of the reform-minded promulgation of the 1946 Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a harmless error rule was adopted.  Rule 
52(a), which implemented the 1919 harmless error statute, mandated that 
“[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”25  Still, the text of the harmless 
error rule did not illuminate the manner in which the rule was to operate in 
practice.26 
A partial answer to that question came that same year in the 1946 case of 
Kotteakos v. United States,27 the first time the Supreme Court fully 
considered the harmless error statute and its import.28  The Court, after 
recounting the development of the harmless error doctrine in the federal 
system and in the states, made clear that the harmless error rule was 
operative29:  “If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the 
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and 
 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000). 
 23. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 182 (noting that in the period just before World War 
II, “[a] very common criticism of criminal appeals has been that appellate courts too often 
reverse a conviction on purely technical considerations”); Marcus A. Kavanagh, 
Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. 
J. 217, 222 (1925) (“The American Courts of Review reflecting as they must the temper of 
the great body of the American Bar, tower above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable 
citadels of technicality.”). 
 24. For example, the American Law Institute, as part of its 1930 Model Code of 
Criminal Procedure, offered a harmless error provision which mandated, 
No judgment shall be reversed or modified unless the appellate court after an 
examination of all the appeal papers is of the opinion that error was committed 
which injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant.  It shall not be 
presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. 
Code of Criminal Procedure § 461 (1930); see also William Brunyate, The American Draft 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930, 49 L.Q. Rev. 192, 205 (1933). 
 25. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).  Rule 52(b) is directed to plain error.  Although this Article 
deals only with harmless error in the criminal context, the harmless error rule in federal civil 
cases is promulgated at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 14 
& n.46 (1997) (noting the sharp distinction between civil and criminal harmless error rules).  
 26. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 2, at 576 (noting that “the terse language of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure offers little guidance” on the question of how the harmless error 
analysis is to proceed). 
 27. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 28. See Saltzburg, supra note 17, at 1007. 
 29. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759–60 (1946). 
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the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a 
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.”30 
B.  Application of the Harmless Error Rule to Constitutional Error 
One thing was certain both before and after Kotteakos—the harmless 
error rule did not apply to constitutional errors at trial.  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision in Chapman v. California,31 constitutional errors 
prompted the automatic reversal of a conviction.32  Indeed, the notion that 
an error implicating a federal constitutional right could be harmless was not 
even taken seriously until the 1960s, when a significant expansion in the 
rights of criminal defendants was underway.33  A five-justice majority in 
the 1963 case of Fahy v. Connecticut34 avoided the question of whether a 
constitutional error could ever be harmless, a question the four dissenters 
answered in the affirmative.35  Four years later, in Chapman, the Court 
made clear that automatic reversal is not required to remedy federal 
constitutional error.36 
Petitioner Ruth Elizabeth Chapman had been convicted at a state trial 
infected with a clear federal constitutional violation and the state supreme 
court upheld the conviction pursuant to the harmless error rule contained in 
California’s constitution.37  After determining that review of federal 
constitutional errors is governed by federal law,38 the Court turned to the 
 
 30. Id. at 764–65.  As Justice Felix Frankfurter explained two decades after the 1919 
harmless error legislation, 
Suffice it to indicate, what every student of the history behind the Act of February 
26, 1919, knows, that that Act was intended to prevent matters concerned with the 
mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure from 
touching the merits of a verdict.  Of a very different order of importance is the 
right of an accused to insist on a privilege which Congress has given him. 
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939). 
 31. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 32. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1, 10 
(2002) (“[U]ntil 1967 it was generally accepted that the finding of any error of constitutional 
dimension was sufficient to merit the reversal of a defendant’s conviction; until that time, 
only errors falling short of constitutional import were susceptible to the harmless error 
rule.”). 
 33. See David McCord, The “Trial”/“Structural” Error Dichotomy:  Erroneous, and 
Not Harmless, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1401, 1404 (1997); see also Goldberg, supra note 6, at 
423 (“Until Fahy v. Connecticut, no court had suggested that a federal constitutional error 
might be harmless.  The Court had never given any serious consideration to the question, and 
no constitutional error had gone unremedied by reversal.”). 
 34. 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
 35. See id. at 94 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Was it constitutionally permissible for 
Connecticut to apply its harmless-error rule to save this conviction from the otherwise 
vitiating effect of the admission of the unconstitutionally seized evidence?  I see no reason 
why not.”). 
 36. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. 
 37. Id. at 19–20. 
 38. Id. at 21 (“Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to 
accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as 
what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and 
whether they have been denied.”). 
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question of whether a federal constitutional error can ever be harmless.  The 
Court noted that a harmless error rule operates in each of the fifty states and 
the federal system, and that none of those rules distinguished between 
errors of statute or rules on the one hand and constitutional error on the 
other.39  Emphasizing the core purpose of harmless error review—avoiding 
the “setting aside [of] convictions for small errors or defects that have little, 
if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial”40—the Court 
expanded the harmless error doctrine to federal constitutional error41: 
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they 
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.42 
Chapman then advanced a standard for judging the harmlessness of a 
constitutional error, declaring that, “before a federal constitutional error can 
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”43 
After Chapman, even where the defendant raises a timely objection to a 
constitutional error below,44 the appellate court may affirm the conviction 
in cases where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that such error did not 
affect the outcome of the proceedings or “did not contribute to the verdict 
 
 39. Id. at 22. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Although this Article does not seek to challenge the application of harmless error 
review to constitutional error per se, others have criticized the harmless constitutional error 
rule as a general matter. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 421 (condemning the harmless 
constitutional error rule as “among the most insidious of legal doctrines”). 
 42. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.  Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court in 
Chapman failed to explain adequately the basis for its decision; it is unclear whether the 
harmless error rule rests “squarely on the Constitution” or is a “subconstitutional rule[] of 
procedure.” Meltzer, supra note 15, at 2, 5.  Professor Daniel Meltzer argues the Supreme 
Court in Chapman may have relied upon what some have called “constitutional common 
law” in fashioning its doctrine. See id. at 26–27.  Unlike Kotteakos, which closely examined 
the federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, the Chapman Court seemed to ignore 
the existing statutory basis for the imposition of the harmless error rule. See id. at 20–21, 26–
27; see also Traynor, supra note 8, at 42. 
 43. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 44. In cases where the defendant failed to make a timely objection below, the defendant 
has the burden of showing that the error was “plain,” and that it “affect[s] substantial rights,” 
and “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” in 
order to trigger the reviewing court’s remedial discretion to correct the error under Rule 
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
735–36 (1993); see also, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631–34 (2002); 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997).  In addition, appellate courts apply a 
different harmless error standard on habeas review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 623, 637–38 (1993) (holding that the standard applied to errors on habeas review is 
whether error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict,’” rather than whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (quoting 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, 
Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 163 (1993). 
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obtained.”45  Two years later, the Supreme Court muddied the waters by 
allowing a conviction to stand despite constitutional error because of the 
“overwhelming” evidence of the defendant’s guilt.46  Since then, the Court 
has shifted between the two standards—harmlessness based upon whether 
the error contributed to the verdict and harmlessness based upon whether 
the residual evidence was overwhelming—in applying the harmless error 
rule to federal constitutional error.47 
Although the Court would be occupied with the tension between the two 
formulations of the harmless constitutional error standard in the years 
following Chapman, another issue would present a different challenge.  In 
the course of expanding harmless error review to constitutional error, the 
Court did note that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair 
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.”48  The 
difficulty of determining which errors can never be harmless—and, thus, 
are reversible per se—continues to present obstacles to achieving a coherent 
conception of harmless error doctrine. 
C.  The Structural Exception to Harmless Constitutional Error 
Although the Supreme Court has made plain that “most constitutional 
errors can be harmless,”49 the Chapman Court noted its “prior cases have 
indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,”50 citing cases 
involving a biased trial judge,51 the evidentiary admission of a coerced 
confession,52 and the denial of the right to counsel at trial.53  Beyond setting 
out these three precedents, the Chapman Court provided no guidance for 
the future ascertainment of those rights “so basic to a fair trial that their 
 
 45. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  Although there has been considerable disagreement on 
the point, see, e.g., Brent M. Craig, “What Were They Thinking?”—A Proposed Approach to 
Harmless Error Analysis, 8 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 1, 6–12 & n.62 (2006), the Supreme Court 
has instructed appellate courts to assess “not what effect the constitutional error might 
generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the 
guilty verdict in the case at hand.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).  
Obviously, there are significant challenges to determining the effect on the jury under either 
approach.  A number of proposals have been advanced to facilitate such determinations. See, 
e.g., Craig, supra, at 15–23 (proposing a hybrid between a jury poll and a special verdict 
form). 
 46. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). 
 47. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 8, at 43–46; Gregory Mitchell, Against 
“Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:  Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 
1335, 1342–47 (1994) (tracing the development of disparate standards). 
 48. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 
 49. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991). 
 50. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 
 51. See id. at 23 n.8 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). 
 52. See id. (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)).  Interestingly, the Court 
would, almost twenty-five years later, apply harmless error review to the admission of a 
coerced confession. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 
 53. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963)). 
  
2038 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error.”54  The Court 
subsequently “adopted an ad hoc approach which resulted in the vast 
majority of constitutional errors being held subject to harmless error 
analysis.”55  Thus, in the wake of Chapman, we knew that harmless error 
review could be applied to many, but not all types of constitutional error; 
however, there was no principled way of determining into which category a 
specific constitutional error would fall. 
Finally, nearly twenty-five years after Chapman, the Court offered a 
framework for determining which constitutional errors were subject to 
automatic reversal and which were subject to harmless error review.  The 
Court, in Arizona v. Fulminante,56 attempted to draw a principled 
distinction between the numerous constitutional errors it had made subject 
to harmless error review and those constitutional errors the Court had 
deemed to be reversible per se.  This attempt yielded the trial 
error/structural error dichotomy to which the Court adheres today.57 
The Court, in Fulminante, distinguished those errors susceptible to 
harmless error review by making a distinction between “trial” errors, 
“which may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of the other 
evidence,”58 and “structural” errors, which “affect[] the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself.”59  To be sure, the term “structural error” does not refer to 
constitutional structure; instead, it corresponds to the “infrastructure” within 
which a criminal case is tried.  Only those constitutional errors that 
“transcend[] the criminal process,”60 and implicate that trial infrastructure 
or framework, according to Fulminante, were reversible per se.61 
Grafting this explanation onto the Court’s precedents that had designated 
certain constitutional errors as not subject to harmless error review, the 
Fulminante majority carved out a category of rights giving rise to such 
structural errors, a category including the right to a public trial, the right to 
pro se representation, the right not to have members of one’s race excluded 
from a grand jury, the right to an unbiased judge, and the right to counsel.62 
This list of structural errors pales in comparison to the remainder of 
constitutional errors, most of which presumably are deemed to be trial error 
 
 54. Id. at 23. 
 55. McCord, supra note 33, at 1406. 
 56. 499 U.S. 279. 
 57. See id. at 307–11; id. at 291 (White, J., dissenting); see also Kamin, supra note 32, 
at 24; McCord, supra note 33, at 1406. 
 58. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08. 
 59. Id. at 310; see also Kamin, supra note 32, at 24. 
 60. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Dow & Rytting, supra note 18, at 484 (“[T]he Supreme Court has concluded that 
constitutional violations that occur during the course of a criminal proceeding fall into one of 
two categories.  They are either structural defects or trial errors.  If an error constitutes a 
structural defect, then it requires automatic reversal.  If it is simply a trial error, however, it 
must be subjected to harmless error analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
 62. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
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and, therefore, subject to harmless error review.63  Indeed, the Court has 
been miserly in its own designation of constitutional errors subject to 
automatic reversal.64  A full decade-and-a-half after Fulminante’s inventory 
of those structural constitutional errors subject to automatic reversal, only 
two additions—a defective reasonable doubt instruction and deprivation of 
counsel of one’s choice—have been made.65 
Not surprisingly, the dichotomy between trial error and structural error 
has been the subject of much criticism.  Some commentators take issue with 
the manner in which the Court distinguishes between trial and structural 
errors, arguing that the Court is far too simplistic,66 and ultimately 
unpersuasive, in its approach to the complex task of determining which 
errors are or are not reversible per se.67  Others attack the dichotomy itself, 
arguing that “[t]he Constitution does not create a hierarchy of rights or 
values,”68 while others try to discern the Court’s rationale for choosing 
certain rights over others in the designation of structural error.69  Some go 
as far as to condemn the application of harmless error review to any 
constitutional error, arguing that all constitutional error should be subject to 
automatic reversal because harmless error doctrine allows appellate courts 
to undermine constitutional decisions they are otherwise bound to apply.70 
 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 306–07 (listing sixteen constitutional errors to which the Court has 
applied harmless error review). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (“[I]t is the duty of a 
reviewing court . . . to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional 
violations.” (citations omitted)); Edwards, supra note 16, at 1176 (“Since Chapman, 
however, the Court has dramatically expanded the list of constitutional violations that are 
subject to harmless-error analysis, while adding few to (and, indeed, subtracting one from) 
the list of violations that are per se reversible.”); see also Martha S. Davis, Harmless Error 
in Federal Criminal and Habeas Jurisprudence:  The Beast That Swallowed the 
Constitution, 25 T. Marshall L. Rev. 45, 69 (1999) (“[E]rrors previously considered harmful 
per se have been falling by the wayside as the [harmless error] rule is applied more and more 
broadly.”). 
 65. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563–65 (2006); Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999). 
 66. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 33, 1460–61. 
 67. Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 195, 204; Ogletree, supra note 4, at 161–66 (criticizing the Fulminante Court for 
“fail[ing] to craft a persuasive rationale for distinguishing between trial and structural 
errors”). 
 68. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
Colum. L. Rev. 79, 90 (1988) (“There is no historical or structural reason to suppose that the 
framers intended rights having truth-furthering purposes to carry more weight than rights 
having other purposes.”). 
 69. Professor Charles Campbell has concluded that the Court militates in favor of 
designating a constitutional error as structural error when (1) the “fundamental” nature of the 
right is explicitly stated in the Constitution, (2) where congressional intent in protecting the 
right is clear, and (3) where the right has particular historical significance. Charles F. 
Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error and Exclusionary 
Rules, 42 Baylor L. Rev. 499, 516–19 (1990).  Another factor cited by Professor Campbell in 
determining when the Supreme Court will designate the violation of a constitutional right as 
structural error is when automatic reversal would be necessary to deter violations of such 
right. See id. at 519. 
 70. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 436. 
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 Pretermitting any quarrel with the wisdom of the Court’s approach to 
articulating the contours of structural error,71 as this Article argues below, 
the lack of a jury finding on every element of the charged offense 
implicates very important institutional interests of the jury, and is anything 
but harmless error. 
II.  ELEMENTAL OMISSIONS AND APPELLATE  
FIRST-GUESSING OF THE JURY 
The basic function of the jury in a criminal trial is to determine whether 
the government has carried its burden of proving each and every element of 
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.72  It is beyond peradventure 
 
 71. While considering the basic legitimacy of Fulminante trial error/structural error 
dichotomy is beyond the scope of this Article, some of the difficulty with the Court’s 
structural error carve-out stems from its grounding in both consequentialist and 
deontological concerns.  To be sure, the impact on the verdict of, for example, the exclusion 
of members of one’s race from the grand jury or the denial of public trial is inefficient and 
difficult (if not impossible) to quantify.  At the same time, such errors implicate interests 
beyond those associated with the determination of a particular defendant’s guilt or 
innocence. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 161–72.  Among these broader interests are the 
intrinsic importance of these rights in our criminal justice system, reliability of the trial as an 
accurate fact-finding mechanism, and public confidence in the outcome of criminal 
proceedings.  As the Fulminante framework would seem to have this dual theoretical 
grounding, the dichotomy may seem unsatisfying to those seeking a unitary and simple 
formula for determining whether harmlessness review might apply to a particular error. 
 72. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (“Taken together, [the 
Fifth Amendment due process and the Sixth Amendment jury trial] rights indisputably entitle 
a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime 
with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 
515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995))).  Conceptually related to an element is an “affirmative defense,” 
which can be defined as “an issue that either lessens or relieves the defendant of criminal 
responsibility even if the formal elements of the crime have been proven.” Scott E. Sundby, 
The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 Hastings L.J. 457, 464 n.32 
(1989); see also Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 199, 200 (1982) (providing a “comprehensive conceptual analysis” of 
defenses).  The burden of proof on affirmative defenses—as distinct from elements—can be 
shifted to the defendant consistent with the Due Process Clause. See generally Martin v. 
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).  But see Mullaney 
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).  Although beyond the scope of this Article, affirmative 
defenses present many interesting questions, including those related to a trial court’s failure 
properly to instruct a jury on an affirmative defense, the requirement that a defendant make a 
threshold showing before a trial court will instruct a jury on an affirmative defense, see, e.g., 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416 (1980); Leach v. Kolb, 911 F.2d 1249, 1256–57 
(7th Cir. 1990), and trial court review of a guilty verdict rejecting an affirmative 
defense. See, e.g., United States v. Mora, 994 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying a 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis to jury rejection of affirmative defense).  For insightful 
scholarly treatment of the relationship between due process, the jury right, and affirmative 
defenses, see, for example, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
297, 304–09 (describing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend a constitutional jury 
guarantee to affirmative defenses); Colleen P. Murphy, Essay, Context and the Allocation of 
Decisionmaking: Reflections on United States v. Gaudin, 82 Va. L. Rev. 961, 977–81 (1996) 
(discussing the jury’s Sixth Amendment responsibility to determine affirmative defenses). 
See also Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1665 (1987) (arguing that due process and legality principles require government 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of affirmative defenses). 
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that the jury must know what elements it is charged with finding before it 
can complete this fundamental task.73  When a court’s instruction to a jury 
omits an element of an offense, misdescribes an element of the offense, or 
erroneously mandates that the jury presume that such element of the offense 
has been established, the criminal defendant’s individual Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial is violated.74  However, as this part discusses, appellate 
courts may, under current Supreme Court doctrine, first-guess the jury, 
declaring an error harmless based on its assessment of what a jury would 
have done had it been properly instructed. 
A.  Elemental Omissions and the Sixth Amendment 
Many trial errors—both nonconstitutional and constitutional—can work 
to impact a jury’s finding on the required elements of a crime.75  For 
instance, an erroneous hearsay ruling may alter the array of evidence from 
which the jury draws its conclusion regarding the establishment of an 
element of the offense.  The erroneous admission of evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may prompt the jury to find an element 
it might not otherwise have found.  However, in those situations, the jury 
has been instructed as to the finding it needs to make on the required 
elements and actually makes the finding, albeit based upon a record affected 
by the erroneous inclusion or exclusion of certain evidence. 
This can be distinguished from a scenario where the jury is prevented 
from making the finding on a required element at all.  The complete 
frustration of the jury’s consideration of required elements of an offense can 
derive from (1) omission of an element from the jury instructions, (2) 
misdescription of an element in the jury instructions, or (3) erroneous jury 
instruction requiring the jury to presume the—either conclusive or 
rebuttable—establishment of an element of the offense. 
An element may be omitted from the jury instructions in a variety of 
ways.  For example, the trial court, due to plain oversight, may fail to 
instruct the jury on an element of the crime explicitly set out in the statute. 
Additionally, a judge may fail to instruct the jury on an element of the 
crime required not by statute, but through the amplification of prior case 
law interpretation of that statute or common law meanings codified in a 
 
 73. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Instructions, Defendant Culpability, and Jury 
Interpretation of Law, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 25, 25–26 (2002). 
 74. See, e.g., Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510 (holding that an elemental omission violates the 
Sixth Amendment); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405–06 (1991) (holding that a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption violates the Sixth Amendment); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 
265–66 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that a mandatory conclusive presumption violates the 
Sixth Amendment); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 509–11 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that an elemental misdescription violates the Sixth Amendment). 
 75. In addition, it should be noted that juries can be misled or confused by instructions 
that are technically correct as a matter of law. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Regulating 
Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1105 (2000); 
Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Paul Marcus, Correcting Deadly Confusion:  
Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 627 (2000). 
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statute.  Omission of an element might even occur through little or no fault 
of the instructing judge, as when he or she follows circuit precedent that is 
good law at the time of trial, but that is later overturned.76  The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that omitted elements errors violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.77 
While the reason for the omission of an element can vary, there is little 
doubt in most instances that an omission, in fact, did occur; a cursory 
review of the transcript will confirm that fact.  However, another, less 
obvious type of elemental error occurs where the trial court attempts to 
instruct the jury on an element, but fails to describe the element correctly.  
Where a court simply gets it wrong with regard to an element of the crime, 
the error prevents the jury from making the specific finding required by the 
statute.  For instance, in Pope v. Illinois, the trial court had misdescribed the 
meaning of an element under a state obscenity statute and the Supreme 
Court determined that this elemental misdescription violated the 
defendant’s due process rights.78 
Another context that gives rise to an elemental error is where the court 
erroneously instructs the jury to presume that an element has been 
established.  For example, in Rose v. Clark,79 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that a state court instruction to a jury to presume malice in a 
murder trial was unconstitutional under the Court’s precedent.80  Likewise, 
in Carella v. California,81 mandatory presumptions as to core elements of 
the crime were deemed to be unconstitutional.82 
All of the aforementioned errors lead to verdicts of guilty based upon a 
jury’s finding of fewer than all the required elements—what this Article 
terms “elemental omission.”  Indeed, the Supreme Court has analogized the 
three aforementioned types of jury instruction errors to one another, 
concluding that they all “preclude[] the jury from making a finding on the 
actual element of the offense.”83  Therefore, elemental omissions often 
 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 77. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10, 522–23 (1995). 
 78. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 
(1979). 
 79. 478 U.S. 570 (1986). 
 80. See id. at 579–80 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom, 
442 U.S. at 520, 523). 
 81. 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam). 
 82. See id. at 265–66; see also id. at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 83. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999) (“In both cases—misdescriptions and 
omissions—the erroneous instruction precludes the jury from making a finding on the actual 
element of the offense.  The same, we think, can be said of conclusive presumptions, which 
direct the jury to presume an ultimate element of the offense based on proof of certain 
predicate facts.”).  Although beyond the scope of this Article, a conceptually related issue is 
the ability of an appellate court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact required to 
establish an element of the crime, and how a jury must be instructed with regard to that 
judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(g) (“In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury 
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.” 
(emphasis added)); 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 
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work a violation of both due process and the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial.  However, as has been discussed, the presence of a constitutional 
violation does not necessarily give rise to a reversal of the conviction. 
B.  Application of Harmless Error Review to Elemental Omissions 
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court determined, in a series of decisions, 
that elemental misdescriptions as well as mandatory rebuttable and 
conclusive presumptions were subject to harmless error review.84  
Nevertheless, a decade later, there remained a question as to whether the 
complete omission (rather than a misdescription or erroneous presumption) 
of an element from a jury instruction also could ever be deemed to be 
harmless.  In the years prior to the Supreme Court’s settling of the issue, 
lower appellate courts had been anything but uniform in their resolution of 
the question whether harmless error could be applied to situations where an 
element had been omitted altogether.85  Some treated the failure to instruct 
the jury on all elements of the offense as per se reversible error,86 while 
others applied harmless error review to such errors.87  However, all of these 
courts couched the issue in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial and due process. 
 
2:1, at 334–38, § 2.10, at 377–82  (3d ed. 2007) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g) 
“is consistent with the well-established principle that a court cannot direct a verdict of 
guilty”); 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual § 201.02[7], at 201–10 (9th ed. 2006) (noting that a trial judge taking 
judicial notice of facts in a criminal case should “assure the jury that factfinding is its 
function”). 
 84. See Carella, 491 U.S. at 265–66 (finding that harmless error applies to erroneous 
mandatory conclusive presumptions); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501–02 (1987) (finding 
that harmless error review applies to misdescribed elements); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
579–82 (1986) (finding that harmless error review applies to erroneous mandatory rebuttable 
presumptions).  The reasoning employed by the Court in reaching those conclusions has 
been subjected to legitimate criticism. See generally, e.g., Greabe, supra note 11.  Justice 
John Paul Stevens made a particularly persuasive case for equating elemental 
misdescriptions with elemental omissions in the course of arguing against the application of 
harmless error review to the former. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 507–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The Court eventually would come around to embrace Stevens’s view that a misdescribed 
element had the same impact as an omitted element. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 10.  However, 
omitted elements would suffer the same fate as elemental misdescriptions. See id. at 12–13 
(subjecting elemental omission to harmless error review). 
 85. See, e.g., Hoover v. Garfield Heights Mun. Ct., 802 F.2d 168, 175 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(noting “some disagreement between the federal courts of appeal as to whether a trial court’s 
failure to instruct on an essential element of an offense may be considered harmless error”). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Gaither, 440 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf. Glenn v. 
Dallman, 686 F.2d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying the rule of automatic reversal to 
omission of “nontechnical” elements). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 616 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979).  Courts of appeals even had conflicting panel 
decisions on the issue. Compare United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1133–34 (2d Cir. 
1974) (applying the rule of automatic reversal), with United States v. Singleton, 532 F.2d 
199, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding no per se automatic reversal); and Redding v. Benson, 
739 F.2d 1360, 1364 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding no per se automatic reversal), with United 
States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the rule of automatic reversal). 
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For example, in Byrd v. United States,88 Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote for 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that a “trial judge’s omission 
to instruct the jury on every essential element of the crime” necessitated 
automatic reversal as such an error prejudiced the defendant’s “substantial 
right to have the jury pass on every essential element of the crime.”89  The 
burden of these errors, in the view of courts, falls squarely upon the 
defendant’s jury trial and due process rights.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit explained, 
Nevertheless, it is not for us [courts] to find the facts.  The Constitution 
forbids conviction absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime.  If the sixth amendment right to have a 
jury decide guilt and innocence means anything, it means that the facts 
essential to conviction must be proven beyond the jury’s reasonable 
doubt, not beyond ours.  A jury verdict, if based on an instruction that 
allows it to convict without properly finding the facts supporting each 
element of the crime, is error.  Such error is not corrected merely because 
an appellate court, upon review, is satisfied that the jury would have 
found the essential facts had it been properly instructed.  The error cannot 
be treated as harmless.90 
The characterization of the injury caused by elemental omissions was 
similarly limited to an emphasis on due process and jury rights by those 
courts applying harmless error.91 
In Johnson v. United States, the Court considered the question of whether 
a trial court’s failure to submit to the jury an element of the crime—
materiality in a perjury prosecution—was structural error.92  The Court, two 
years prior in United States v. Gaudin,93 had decided that failure to submit 
the element of materiality to the jury violated the defendant’s rights under 
the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment “to have a jury determine, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with 
 
 88. 342 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 89. Id. at 942; see also Glenn v. Dallman, 686 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The 
failure to instruct a jury on an essential element of a crime is error because it deprives the 
defendant of the right ‘to have the jury told what crimes he is actually being tried for and 
what the essential elements of these crimes are.’  This error is not rectified solely because a 
reviewing court is satisfied after the fact of a conviction that sufficient evidence existed that 
the jury would or could have found that the state proved the missing element had the jury 
been properly instructed.” (citations omitted)); Howard, 506 F.2d at 1134 (“When [the 
defendant] exercised his constitutional right to a jury, he put the Government to the burden 
of proving the elements of the crimes charged to a jury’s satisfaction, not to ours or to the 
district judge’s.  Thus, even if we believe that there was overwhelming proof of the elements 
not charged, we must still reverse.”). 
 90. Voss, 787 F.2d at 398 (citations omitted). 
 91. See, e.g., Benson, 739 F.2d at 1363 n.3 (describing the court’s error in In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
 92. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). 
 93. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
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which he is charged.”94  The Johnson Court, under the plain error 
analysis,95 considered whether such a constitutional error constituted 
structural error and, therefore, “affect[ed] substantial rights,”96 satisfying 
one of the prongs of plain error analysis.  Although ultimately sidestepping 
the issue,97 the Court opined that the erroneous and unconstitutional failure 
to submit the materiality element could be analogized to elemental 
misdescriptions and erroneous conclusive mandatory presumptions—both 
subject to harmless error analysis—as easily as it can be analogized to the 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction, which had been deemed in Sullivan 
v. Louisiana98 to be structural error.99 
The Sullivan case did, indeed, provide a strong argument for the 
treatment of elemental omission as structural error.  The Court, in Sullivan, 
first clarified that harmless error review is concerned 
not [with] whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.  That 
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact 
rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict 
might be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.100 
 Working from this premise, the Court explained why harmless error 
review could not apply to an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction: 
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the 
question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly 
meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error 
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a 
jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt—not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. 
That is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for 
the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding 
of guilty.101 
 
 94. Id. at 522–23; see also Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in 
Criminal Cases, 115 Yale L.J. 922, 932–33 (2006) (discussing the Court’s reasoning in 
Gaudin). 
 95. See supra note 44. 
 96. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). 
 97. The Court determined that it was not necessary to decide the structural error question 
because it did not believe the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,’” which is a prerequisite for correcting an error on plain 
error review. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). 
 98. 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
 99. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 (citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280). 
 100. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted). 
 101. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).  The Court went on to add that the erroneous 
reasonable doubt instruction is clearly on the structural side of the Fulminante trial 
error/structural error dichotomy:  “The right to trial by jury reflects, we have said, ‘a 
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The Court attempted to distinguish erroneous conclusive mandatory 
presumptions on the basis that such errors could be harmless because other 
jury findings could be considered “functionally equivalent to finding the 
element required to be presumed.”102  The Sullivan Court, however, did not 
explicitly advance a basis for distinguishing an omitted or misdescribed 
element from an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction.  In both scenarios, 
“[t]here is no object . . . upon which harmless error scrutiny can operate,” as 
there has not been a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on each and 
every required element of the charged offense.103  Indeed, in the years 
subsequent to the Sullivan decision, some lower courts and commentators 
argued persuasively that the case dictated that omitted and misdescribed 
elements be exempted from harmless error review.104 
Despite the logical force of the argument that the violation of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments represented by elemental omissions and 
misdescriptions should be deemed structural error under the reasoning of 
Sullivan, the Supreme Court had made no definitive statement until the 
1999 case of Neder v. United States.105  In Neder, the defendant was 
convicted by a jury of certain tax offenses; however, the district court had 
instructed the jury that it “need not consider”106 whether the alleged false 
statements were material as that was deemed, under then-circuit precedent, 
to be a question for the court to decide.107  Although the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that instruction erroneous—and 
violative of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments—it applied harmless error 
review and ultimately held the error to be harmless.108 
 
profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered.’  The deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error.’”  Id. at 281–
82 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). 
 102. Id. at 281 (citing Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)).  This reasoning has been criticized on the grounds that “the idea of ‘functional 
equivalence’ is sufficiently elastic as to permit results that are contrary to Sullivan’s spirit.” 
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Effect of Sullivan v. Louisiana on Harmless Error Analysis of 
Jury Instructions That Omit an Element of the Offense, 29 Rutgers L.J. 315, 323 (1998). 
 103. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280. 
 104. See, e.g., Greabe, supra note 11, at 850; Rosenberg, supra note 102, at 321 & n.38 
(collecting cases). 
 105. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  The Court was confronted with the issue during the previous 
term in Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998).  Although the Court recognized that 
whether harmless error review could apply to elemental omissions was “an important 
constitutional question,” the Court was able to avoid the issue. See id. at 256 (determining 
that the jury instruction in question did not, in fact, omit an element). 
 106. Neder, 527 U.S. at 6. 
 107. Id. at 6–7. 
 108. See United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459, 1465 (11th Cir. 1998).  Subsequent to the 
trial and prior to disposition of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit appeal, the 
Supreme Court had decided United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), which established 
that materiality was an element to be submitted to the jury. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 6–7. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed.109  Rather than extending the reasoning of 
Sullivan to designate an elemental omission as structural error, the Court 
reasoned that “[t]he conclusion that the omission of an element is subject to 
harmless-error analysis is consistent with the holding (if not the entire 
reasoning) of Sullivan v. Louisiana.”110  Although the Court acknowledged 
that Sullivan’s reasoning “does provide support for Neder’s position,”111 it 
endorsed the Government’s view “that the absence of a ‘complete verdict’ 
on every element of the offense establishes no more than that an improper 
instruction on an element of the offense violates the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial guarantee.”112  The Court then analogized this “omitted elements” 
constitutional error to its precedents by applying harmless error review to 
elemental misdescription and mandatory conclusive presumption errors, 
both of which are circumstances in which “the jury did not render a 
‘complete verdict’ on every element of the offense.”113 
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has been the leading voice on the Court in 
favor of the jury trial right,114 issued a blistering partial dissent in which he, 
at the outset, declared his belief “that depriving a criminal defendant of the 
right to have the jury determine his guilt of the crime charged—which 
necessarily means his commission of every element of the crime charged—
can never be harmless.”115  Scalia criticized the seeming illogic of the 
majority’s reaffirmation “that it would be structural error (not susceptible of 
‘harmless-error’ analysis) to ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings,’”116 while it 
applies harmless error to a jury’s finding of fewer than all the elements 
required for a valid guilty verdict.117 
Scalia’s dissent also condemned the manner in which the majority 
authorized the appellate court to speculate as to what the jury’s conclusion 
 
 109. Neder, 527 U.S. 1. 
 110. Id. at 10. 
 111. Id. at 11.  Ellis Neder argued that because the jury was prevented by the error from 
rendering a complete verdict, there was, as in Sullivan, “no object . . . upon which the 
harmless-error scrutiny can operate.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 
(1993)). 
 112. Id. at 12. 
 113. Id. at 13.  The majority did concede that “[i]t would not be illogical to extend the 
reasoning of Sullivan from a defective ‘reasonable doubt’ instruction to a failure to instruct 
on an element of the crime.” Id. at 15.  However, invoking Oliver Wendell Holmes’s insight 
that “the life of the law has not been logic but experience,” the majority noted that such an 
extension is not warranted in a case such as Neder, in which materiality was not a central 
issue, was not contested by the defendant, and the evidence of which was stark. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. 
Am. L. 15, 16 (2006) (“Since joining the Court, the Justice has been a staunch advocate of 
the jury guarantee.  He has eloquently explained in numerous opinions that a failure to 
instruct a jury on all material elements of the crime charged or to give a proper definition of 
reasonable doubt can never be harmless error.”). 
 115. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. Id. at 32–33 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 117. Id. at 33 (“The question that this raises is why, if denying the right to conviction by 
jury is structural error, taking one of the elements of the crime away from the jury should be 
treated differently from taking all of them away—since failure to prove one, no less than 
failure to prove all, utterly prevents conviction.”). 
  
2048 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
would have been had it been properly instructed, which he argued, “puts 
appellate courts in the business of reviewing the defendant’s guilt.”118  
Justice Scalia concluded by characterizing the majority’s reasoning as 
having derived from undue confidence in judges which leads to an 
undermining of the right to jury trial, unwarranted concern that a significant 
number of convictions will be overturned if elemental omissions are treated 
as structural error, and the unjustifiable concern for expediency at the 
expense of the defendant’s right to have a jury find guilt on all elements of 
the crime.119 
Thus, after Neder, elemental omissions, elemental misdescriptions, and 
erroneous mandatory presumptions—all deprivations of the defendant’s 
right to have a jury find every element of the charged offense and, 
therefore, violative of the Sixth Amendment—are subject to harmless error 
review.  If an appellate court first-guesses a jury—i.e., determines that the 
jury would have found the missing element if properly instructed—the 
conviction may stand. 
C.  First-Guessing the Jury 
Harmless constitutional error review generally raises the concern that the 
jury function is being compromised by some constitutional error that 
interferes with its review.  For instance, the admission of evidence that was 
obtained in violation of the Constitution or a prosecutor’s improper 
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify would seem to alter the 
evidence before the jury and, therefore, impact its ultimate deliberation and 
decision.  Application of the traditional “overwhelming evidence” test on 
harmless error review—a test that queries whether the untainted evidence is 
sufficient to support the conviction—places the appellate court into the 
jury’s fact-finding role, a role it is neither intended nor competent to 
perform.120 
This concern about the integrity of the jury’s fact-finding function is 
heightened in the case of elemental omissions.  The distinction between 
general harmless error review, which “always involves some second-
guessing of the initial factfinder’s conclusions,”121 and harmless error 
 
 118. Id. at 39.  Justice Antonin Scalia characterized the majority opinion as “the only 
instance . . . in which the remedy for a constitutional violation by a trial judge (making the 
determination of criminal guilt reserved to the jury) is a repetition of the same constitutional 
violation by the appellate court (making the determination of criminal guilt reserved to the 
jury).” Id. at 32. 
 119. See id. at 39–40 (“The recipe that has produced today’s ruling consists of one part 
self-esteem, one part panic, and one part pragmatism.”).  Justice Stevens agreed, in his own 
concurrence, with Justice Scalia’s core views about application of harmless error review, but 
criticized Justice Scalia on his methodology, in particular the fact that Scalia would not take 
the argument to its logical conclusion—that the error should be reversible per se even if a 
defendant fails to object below. See id. at 27–28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 120. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1340 (criticizing the “overwhelming evidence” test). 
 121. Id. 
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review of elemental omissions is a stark one.  In the latter context, the 
appellate court is determining not whether what the jury did—finding all 
the required elements of the offense—was impacted by the constitutional 
error, or whether the jury would have done what it did but for the 
constitutional error, but what the jury would have done had it been properly 
instructed.  The appellate substitution of the jury’s judgment—through 
engaging in an inquiry of what a properly instructed jury would have 
done—is what this Article terms “first-guessing” the jury.  Justice John 
Paul Stevens, in his dissent in Pope v. Illinois, captured the essence of the 
first-guessing phenomenon: 
An application of the harmless-error doctrine under these circumstances 
would not only violate petitioners’ constitutional right to trial by jury, but 
would also pervert the notion of harmless error.  When a court is asked to 
hold that an error that occurred did not interfere with the jury’s ability to 
legitimately reach the verdict that it reached, harmless-error analysis may 
often be appropriate.  But this principle cannot apply unless the jury found 
all of the elements required to support a conviction.  The harmless-error 
doctrine may enable a court to remove a taint from proceedings in order to 
preserve a jury’s findings, but it cannot constitutionally supplement those 
findings.  It is fundamental that an appellate court (and for that matter, a 
trial court) is not free to decide in a criminal case that, if asked, a jury 
would have found something that it did not find.122 
Stevens was supported in his views by four decades of his colleagues’ own 
statements on the topic.  In Bollenbach v. United States,123 a case decided in 
1946, the same year that Kotteakos applied the harmless error rule to 
nonconstitutional errors, the Court remarked, 
From presuming too often all errors to be “prejudicial,” the judicial 
pendulum need not swing to presuming all errors to be “harmless” if only 
the appellate court is left without doubt that one who claims its corrective 
process is, after all, guilty.  In view of the place of importance that trial by 
jury has in our Bill of Rights, it is not to be supposed that Congress 
intended to substitute the belief of appellate judges in the guilt of an 
accused, however justifiably engendered by the dead record, for 
ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial guidance, 
however cumbersome that process may be.124 
This missive cautioning appellate restraint on harmless error review of 
errors that implicate the province of the jury would be followed by other 
statements directed specifically to the importance of appellate courts 
respecting jury review of each element of the charged crime: 
It should hardly need saying that a judgment of conviction cannot be 
entered against a defendant no matter how strong the evidence is against 
him, unless that evidence has been presented to a jury (or a judge, if a jury 
 
 122. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 509–10 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
 123. 326 U.S. 607 (1946). 
 124. Id. at 615. 
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is waived) and unless the jury (or judge) finds from that evidence that the 
defendant’s guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  It cannot 
be “harmless error” wholly to deny a defendant a jury trial on one or all 
elements of the offense with which he is charged.125 
First-guessing, as discussed above, improperly substitutes the appellate 
court’s judgment for that of the jury.126  As the Court in Duncan v. 
Louisiana emphasized about the function of the jury, “[p]roviding an 
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”127  With first-guessing, 
the defendant is protected from neither. 
The Court’s tolerance of first-guessing in the harmless error review of 
elemental omission is likely prompted by concerns of efficiency, order 
maintenance, and finality.128  Whatever its motivation, however, it is based 
on flawed reasoning and an emaciated view of the jury trial right.129  Critics 
of the Court’s reasoning have articulated persuasive arguments regarding 
the Sixth Amendment and what it requires of appellate review of elemental 
omission error.130  However, those arguments based upon the Sixth 
 
 125. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650 (1976) (White, J., concurring); cf. United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 409 (1947) (“A failure 
to charge correctly is not harmless, since the verdict might have resulted from the incorrect 
instruction.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 n.12 (1977) (“[E]ven if we 
accept the court’s conclusion, under these circumstances it is not an adequate substitute for 
the decision in the first instance of a properly instructed jury, as to this important element of 
the offense . . . .”). 
 127. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 128. For example, the Neder majority also pointed to the difficulties that would be 
associated with federal habeas review of state convictions under Neder’s desired approach, 
which would require federal courts “to ascertain the elements of the offense as defined in the 
laws of 50 different States.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999); see also id. at 
39–40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out efficiency concerns 
underlying the majority opinion). 
 129. See Linda E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases:  
The Supreme Court’s “No Harm, No Foul” Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 Am. J. 
Crim. L. 229, 239 (2001) (“The cases involving a failure to instruct on an element of the 
crime have elevated the ‘no harm, no foul’ policy over reasoned analysis.  Although there is 
no verdict on an element of the crime in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the 
Court applies a harmless error analysis. The Neder case is the Court’s most troubling 
moment.  A serious, fundamental foul is called, but there is no penalty.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Greabe, supra note 11, at 851–52, 857; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 68, at 
133 (“[A] court should not uphold a conviction or conclude that a defendant has not shown 
the requisite level of outcome-influencing prejudice when the court’s judgment is based on 
its own probabilistic impressions of what a jury actually did or what a hypothetical 
reasonable jury is likely to do.  Such actions would be inconsistent with a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a jury trial.”).  But see Rosenberg, supra note 102, at 336 (“[A] jury 
instruction that omits or misstates in a material fashion an element of the charged crime 
injures the defendant and the jury itself.”).  The party and amicus briefs in Neder 
demonstrate the focus on the Sixth Amendment jury trial right rather than the institutional 
interests of the jury. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 27–28, Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999) (No. 97-1985); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (No. 97-
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Amendment right to jury trial simply have failed to carry the day.  This 
Article does not seek to fight that battle again, but instead offers an 
alternative justification for disputing the application of harmless error 
review to elemental omissions.  This Article advances an institutional 
justification for the inclusion of elemental omission in the category of those 
structural errors subject to automatic reversal—a justification that cannot 
easily be set aside because of courts’ willingness to subordinate the jury 
trial right to the pragmatic values advanced by the harmless error rule. 
III.  INSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATING ELEMENTAL OMISSIONS 
AS STRUCTURAL ERROR 
As has been discussed, the Supreme Court has been sparing at best with 
regard to designating structural error subject to automatic reversal.  The 
violation of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right caused by omission or 
misdescription of an element of a crime has been consistently categorized 
by the Supreme Court as an error subject to harmless error review.131  Short 
of the Court’s wholesale repudiation of the reasoning applying harmless 
error review to such constitutional violations, what might support their 
inclusion in the category of structural error?  Institutional considerations 
dictate automatic reversal of convictions infected with elemental omission 
and misdescription errors even where the Sixth Amendment does not.132  
Appellate first-guessing of the jury’s probable verdict wholly undermines 
the jury’s constitutional function from its own institutional perspective. 
Although this Article does not dispute the traditional case for the 
automatic reversal of verdicts infected with these Sixth Amendment 
violations, it advances an alternative theory for inclusion of elemental 
omissions in the category of reversible error.  While the entitlement to 
demand (or waive) a jury trial rests with the criminal defendant, the jury has 
separate and distinct institutional interests.  Among these are the 
maintenance of the jury’s structural role in government and its function as 
the voice of the community.  Injuries to these institutional interests remain, 
regardless of whether the individual criminal defendant is deemed to have 
been prejudiced.  Once we acknowledge the damage appellate harmless 
error first-guessing of juries levies upon the institutional interests of the 
jury, the rationale for mandating automatic reversal of elemental omission 
errors becomes apparent. 
 
1985); Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 20–23, Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (No. 97-1985). 
 131. See Neder, 527 U.S. 1; supra Part II.B. 
 132. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 432 (“The harmless constitutional error doctrine 
works only a petty theft on individual defendants’ rights in specific cases but its consistent 
application exerts a more profound effect upon society.  The harmless constitutional error 
rule, regardless of the test, militates against basic freedoms and controls upon governmental 
institutions that operate against individuals.”). 
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A.  The Structural and Institutional Significance of the Jury 
The guarantee of “trial by jury . . . is fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice,”133 so much so that is has been described as “the spinal 
column of American democracy.”134  A review of Article III’s mandate that 
“[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury”135 immediately highlights 
the structural significance of the jury.  The framers saw the jury as an 
indispensable organ of government.136  Although the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees to individuals the right to jury trial, the Article III Jury Clause 
cements the permanent role of the jury in the framework of government 
itself.137  As Professor Akhil Amar persuasively has argued, “[I]t is 
anachronistic to see jury trial as an issue of individual right rather than 
(also, and more fundamentally) a question of government structure.”138  
Likewise, under state constitutions, the jury has had a celebrated role; all 
the early state constitutions, many of which were drafted by those involved 
with the framing of the Federal Constitution, held the right to jury trial in 
high esteem.139  Indeed, on both the federal and state levels, the jury was 
thought to be a key protection of individual freedom against the excesses of 
the branches of tripartite government.140 
 
 133. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 134. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When 
this Court deals with the content of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee—the only one to 
appear in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—it is operating upon the 
spinal column of American democracy.”). 
 135. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  Although modern criminal procedure, of course, permits a 
defendant to waive a jury trial, this procedural fact does not necessarily diminish the 
institutional significance of the jury. See infra note 162. 
 136. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1043, 1048 (2006) (“In the Nation’s early history, 
the criminal jury held a place of prominence in the constitutional order.”); Suja A. Thomas, 
Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 767, 779–82 (2005) (discussing the 
Constitution’s “division of power between the judiciary and the jury”). 
 137. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004)  (“[T]he very reason the 
Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust 
government to mark out the role of the jury.”). 
 138. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 104 (1998); see also Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the right to jury trial as a 
“structural guarantee”). 
 139. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (“The constitutions adopted by 
the original States guaranteed jury trial.  Also, the constitution of every State entering the 
Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.”); 
see also id. at 154 (“Jury trial continues to receive strong support.  The laws of every State 
guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are 
there significant movements underway to do so.”).  But see Nancy Jean King, The American 
Criminal Jury, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41, 43 (1999) (noting that, “[e]ven though every 
state guaranteed the right to a jury trial for at least some criminal charges, state law differed 
as to what that right entailed”). 
 140. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury:  The Criminal Jury’s 
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 63–64 
(2003); Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1356 (“Although trial by jury serves many purposes for 
the jurors and the justice system, the primary rationale for jury trial has consistently been 
that it serves as a bulwark against official tyranny.”). 
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Although the importance of the jury’s role in the American criminal 
justice system requires no extended discussion, it bears emphasizing the 
community voice function the jury performs.141  As the Supreme Court in 
Duncan noted, in affirming the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to the 
States, “Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal 
Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this 
insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or 
innocence.”142  This structural role of the jury is meant to ensure the input 
of the citizenry in the operation of the courts and government more 
generally.  Even recently, the Supreme Court has noted that Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial is “no mere procedural formality, but a 
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure . . . meant 
to ensure [the people’s] control in the judiciary.”143  The moral values of 
the community are expressed through jury service, deliberation, and verdict, 
and that expression is a function and prerogative of the jury that is 
independent of the right of the criminal defendant to demand it.144 
The framers saw the jury as the means for the citizenry to hold ultimate 
sway over the judicial function of government, in the same way power was 
given, by means of the ballot, over the legislative and executive 
functions.145  Indeed, Thomas Jefferson even expressed a preference for 
citizen oversight of the affairs of the judiciary through jury service over 
analogous oversight of the legislative branch through the cherished model 
of representative government.146 
 
 141. Alexis de Tocqueville famously described the jury as “the voice of the community.” 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 316–18 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
Library of America 2004) (1862); see also Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury:  The Criminal 
Justice System’s Different Voice, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1377, 1392–97 (1994) (discussing the 
jury’s “community voice” function). 
 142. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
 143. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 144. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1355 (“A criminal jury trial is a vehicle both for 
determining guilt and for expressing community values.”); Laura I. Appleman, The Lost 
Meaning of the Jury Trial Right (Jan. 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084960 (arguing for a broader, 
community-based notion of the jury trial right). 
 145. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306 (“Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control 
in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
judiciary.” (citing, inter alia, Letter XV by the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 
The Complete Anti-Federalist 315, 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (describing the jury as 
“secur[ing] to the people at large, their just and rightful controul in the judicial 
department”))); John Adams, Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771), reprinted in 2 Works of John 
Adams 252, 253 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little & Brown 1950) (1850) (“[T]he common 
people, should have as complete a control . . . in every judgment of a court of judicature” as 
in the legislature.)); see also New York v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (N.Y. 1995) (“Jury 
service—a privilege and duty of citizenship—is . . . a fundamental means of participating in 
government.” (citation omitted)); Barkow, supra note 140, at 63–64.  It should be noted, 
however, that the framers’ narrow view of the “citizenry” eligible to serve on a jury excluded 
most members of the “community.” See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury 
Selection in Criminal Cases:  A Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo. L.J. 945, 960–61 (1998).  
 146. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in 15 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (“Were I called upon to 
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Another institutional prerogative of the jury derives from the Double 
Jeopardy Clause and its mandate that jury verdicts of acquittal remain 
inviolate.147  Juries can, of course, engage in nullification, introducing 
mercy into the criminal justice system or communicating their messages to 
the legislature regarding the wisdom of its laws, the judiciary regarding its 
sentencing and process oversight, and the executive regarding its 
enforcement and prosecution priorities.148  Regardless of the normative 
merits of whether juries should engage in nullification, this ancient power 
of the petit jury is plenary and unreviewable.149  Furthermore, although this 
“voice of the community role” includes the power of citizens to nullify, its 
function extends beyond that.150  Lay jurors bring a perspective to the 
criminal fact-finding process the framers thought valuable enough to 
enshrine in the body of the Constitution.151  Juries also serve the 
institutional function of training the citizen-jurors in the processes of 
democratic governance.  Through jury service, citizens participate in the 
machinery of government, learning about it while influencing and shaping it 
at the same time.152  As Alexis de Tocqueville remarked when commenting 
 
decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I 
would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.”). 
 147. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”). 
 148. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 498 (1966); Lysander Spooner, 
An Essay on the Trial by Jury (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1852); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1015 (2006) (“The jury’s 
unreviewable power to acquit gives it the ability to check both the legislative and executive 
branches.”); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:  Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 701 (1995) (“The jurors, in judging the law, function as 
an important and necessary check on government power.”); Goldberg, supra note 6, at 431 
n.98 (“Jury nullification is not a particularly common event, and may not often be affected 
by an evidence error.  However, there may be circumstances in which a jury failed to 
exercise its power to nullify the law because the error admitted evidence that dissuaded it 
from nullification, or excluded evidence which, if heard, would have persuaded the jury to 
nullify.”); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 
1505–09 (2001); Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1356–57 (“Substantive criminal laws may be 
misguided, sentencing laws may be overly harsh, prosecutions may be selectively imposed, 
and judges may be biased.  Citizens therefore rely on the common sense and mercy of a jury, 
through its nullification power, to keep both laws and government officials from working an 
injustice.”); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 68, at 138–42. 
 149. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 140, at 58–59; King, supra note 139, at 50–53; 
Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1356–57; cf. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and 
Constitutional Design, 93 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2008) (discussing the power of 
grand juries to “nullify” consistent with constitutional design). 
 150. Of course, even a jury not instructed on all the elements of the crime could choose to 
engage in nullification.  However, jury deliberation undoubtedly is impacted when the jury is 
not fully instructed as to the elements it is required to find in order to convict. 
 151. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972) (defining a properly 
functioning jury as “a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the community 
who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate, free from outside attempts at 
intimidation, on the question of a defendant’s guilt”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
156 (1968) (“If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more 
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.”). 
 152. See, e.g., 1 J. Kendall Few, Trial by Jury 60 (1993) (citing “education of the 
citizenry in the administration of law” as a positive consequence of jury trial); Jason 
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upon the manner in which the American jury serves as a vehicle for the 
education of the citizenry, “[T]he jury, which is the most energetic form of 
popular rule, is also the most effective means of teaching people how to 
rule.”153 
These constitutional and traditional institutional functions of the jury, 
many of which are separate and distinct from the role of securing the 
individual rights of criminal defendants, have begun to receive the greater 
recognition they deserve.  The late twentieth-century renaissance of the jury 
trial right,154 marked by Apprendi and its progeny, may have been 
prompted more by respect for the institutional legitimacy of the jury and its 
constitutional role and prerogatives than for the jury rights of criminal 
defendants.  As Dean Louis D. Bilionis has explained, the recent trend in 
the Supreme Court criminal procedure jurisprudence has been to emphasize 
the institutional interests of the jury: 
The recent cases, furthermore, tend to focus on justice as perceived from 
the perspective of our institutions and the public that has some moral 
stake in their operation, rather than from the perspective of the criminally 
accused individual.  The Apprendi line of opinions, for instance, stresses 
the jury’s historical importance as a structural antidote to judicial power 
rather than the value of lay decision making as a bulwark of liberty for 
individuals.  The emphasis is on the system’s explicit and implicit 
protestations and the perceptions of legitimacy that follow.155   
Recent precedents outside of the harmless error context would seem to 
confirm that the Court has recognized that the jury has its own institutional 
interest apart from serving as the vehicle for the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.156  Indeed, the Court even may be said to have 
 
Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 35, 47 (2006) (discussing Justice 
Harry Blackmun’s view of juries as “an aspect of a functioning democracy”). 
 153. De Tocqueville, supra note 141, at 318.  De Tocqueville went on to note that “[t]he 
jury is incredibly useful in shaping the people’s judgment and augmenting their natural 
enlightenment. . . . It should be seen as a free school . . . .” Id. at 316; see also Renée Lettow 
Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial:  The Silent Judge, 42 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 195, 198–99 (2000) (discussing De Tocqueville’s view that the judge, lawyers, and 
litigants all contributed to the democratic education of jurors). 
 154. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 136, at 1048–64 (2006) (discussing the revitalization 
of the jury trial guarantee during the final years of the Rehnquist Court era). 
 155. Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the Conservative Reformation, 94 Geo. L. 
J. 1347, 1354 (2006).  But see Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional 
Allocations of Power, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 465, 466–68 (2002) (recognizing the diminished role 
of juries in the modern criminal justice system). 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005) (“The effect of the 
increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges, however, was to increase the 
judge’s power and diminish that of the jury.”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 
(2004) (“There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm for criminal 
justice:  not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of 
limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury.”); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (“The New Jersey procedure challenged 
in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part 
of our criminal justice system.”). 
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subordinated its focus on the individual’s entitlement to a jury trial to the 
structural and institutional value of the jury. 
B.  Damage Done by Appellate First-Guessing to the  
Institutional Interests of the Jury 
There is ample support for the view that the jury has institutional 
interests separate and distinct from that of the criminal defendant upon 
whose fate it deliberates.  By its very nature, harmless error review would 
seem to allow the appellate court, in varying degrees, to encroach on these 
interests by making factual assessments about the impact of a constitutional 
error upon the jury’s fact-finding process.  Indeed, some have argued that 
“[t]he greatest cost of the harmless constitutional error rule is its usurpation 
of the jury function.”157  This “trampl[ing] over the jury’s function”158 is 
particularly acute in the case of first-guessing on harmless error review of 
elemental omissions.  In addition to the injury it visits upon the due process 
and jury trial rights of the individual defendant, first-guessing levies a 
tremendous toll upon the institutional interests and structural integrity of the 
jury itself.  Although the Court, in permitting appellate first-guessing has 
determined that elemental omissions do not warrant a remedy of automatic 
reversal, it has ignored the various ways first-guessing undermines the 
institutional interests of the jury. 
First-guessing substitutes the appellate court’s judgment for that of the 
jury and, therefore, obviates the jury’s function.  In most harmless error 
review contexts, the appellate court is merely confirming what the jury has, 
in fact, done.  (The jury has found all of the elements, but we need to 
determine whether the constitutional violation caused that to happen.)  
Although some may have a degree of discomfort with the appellate court 
performing that role, at least there is a complete jury verdict upon which to 
conduct the inquiry.  However, in the case of first-guessing, the appellate 
court is stepping into the jury’s shoes and finding one (or more) of the 
elements for the jury.  The appellate court is reaching a conclusion the jury 
has not reached and, in so doing, it is performing the role of surrogate for 
the jury, the entity to which the Constitution entrusts—and assigns—the 
fact-finding function.  This substitution of the appellate court fact-finding 
for the jury’s fact-finding relegates the jury to a position of partial filter 
rather than the exclusive fact-finder role it has been assigned by the 
Constitution and tradition.  As a result, the institutional standing of the jury 
is diminished. 
Permitting the removal of a required factual finding from the jury is an 
invitation to further compromise the jury’s institutional role.  Once we 
 
 157. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 430; see also Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1354 (“[W]hen 
an appellate court assumes the role of fact-finder in a criminal case, it usurps the role of the 
jury . . . .”). 
 158. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 36 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that applying harmless error to an elemental omission “throws 
open the gate for appellate courts to trample over the jury’s function”). 
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permit appellate judges to make one of the findings that the Constitution 
requires the jury to make, what principle operates to prevent the appellate 
judges from making multiple findings reserved to the jury?159  The Court 
has indicated that harmless error review does not apply to an error that 
“vitiates all the jury’s findings,”160  but what about one-third of those 
findings?  Half?161  The appellate court’s first-guessing of the jury with 
regard to multiple elements works no more significant a constitutional 
injury (to the defendant and the jury itself) than does the first-guessing on 
one of those elements.  Undermining the jury’s core institutional 
prerogative as fact-finder in seemingly limited ways may open the 
floodgates for future transgressions against the jury’s role in the name of 
the pragmatic values the harmless error rule represents. 
Furthermore, the ability of appellate courts to first-guess a jury on 
harmless error review fosters diminished respect for the jury as an 
institution.  For trial courts, respect for the jury may begin to wane due to 
the gradual realization that the jury is not truly the exclusive finder of fact 
in cases where a defendant elects to assert the right to jury trial.162  Such a 
recognition could impact trial judges’ thought processes regarding issues 
related to the jury and its prerogative.  For appellate courts, stepping into 
the shoes of the jury as fact-finder inevitably leads to a diminished 
appreciation of the special nature of concentrated deliberation of a jury.163  
This attitude can easily spill over into appellate decision making related to 
 
 159. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 160. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). 
 161. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–32, Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (No. 97-1985).  At the 
argument, the assistant solicitor general conceded that harmless error review could apply to 
multiple omitted elements. 
 162. Of course, a defendant may impact the jury’s institutional interests by waiving the 
right to jury trial in part, such as with the stipulation of a fact establishing an element, see 
United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 1997), but see id. at 673–76 (Ryan, J., 
concurring separately), or in total, such as with a guilty plea. See, e.g., Bruce P. Smith, Plea 
Bargaining and the Eclipse of the Jury, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 131 (2005); Ronald F. 
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 79, 87–100 (2005).  But see Appleman, supra note 144 (querying whether the 
community-based notion of the jury trial right conflicts with the defendant’s ability to waive 
trial); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 Minn. 
L. Rev. 398, 433 n.156 (2006) (citing Amar, supra note 138, at 104–08 (questioning the 
constitutional analysis underlying the waivability of the jury trial right)).  Furthermore, a 
defendant simply might decline to appeal an elemental omission error.  As such, it might be 
said that the jury right is both a societal right and individual right, see generally Appleman, 
supra note 144 (arguing for a broader, community-based notion of the jury trial right), and 
society depends on the individual to vindicate that right.  Although the defendant may 
decline the jury’s protection, where the jury is called upon, its institutional role should be 
respected.  In other words, although the petit jury’s institutional role does depend, in certain 
ways, upon the willingness of the defendant to resist the government’s case, this reality 
should not serve to diminish the institutional significance of the jury in those cases in which 
the accused does put the government to its proof. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 299–303.  
In sum, modern criminal procedure’s erosion of the important institutional interests of the 
jury need not be further exacerbated by harmless error review of elemental omission errors. 
 163. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 827 
(2001); Mazzone, supra note 152, at 38–39 & n.17. 
  
2058 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
the jury.  If the public (from which the jury is drawn) is informed about the 
appellate court’s intrusion on the jury’s fact-finding role, it could lead to the 
loss of the jury’s prestige among the populace, and could even have the 
effect of diminishing the conscientiousness of future juries, with jurors 
assuming that appellate courts will come behind them and fill in the gaps. 
First-guessing also may contribute to a loosening of attention paid by 
trial courts to the accuracy of jury instructions.  While judges would not 
deliberately seek to misinstruct juries, some may take comfort in knowing 
that the verdict can be saved by appellate first-guessing on harmless error 
review if the jury instruction omits or misdescribes an element of the 
offense.  Consequently, there may be less of an incentive to be vigilant with 
regard to the trial court’s solemn responsibility to guide the jury in its 
deliberations. 
Further, although a finding is being made by an appellate judge on the 
omitted elements, those elements are not being considered through the lens 
of lay people, a key feature of the jury institution.  The common sense 
conclusions of a jury may differ from the learned eye of an appellate judge, 
even when viewing the same evidence.  Appellate judges obviously are in 
no better a position than a jury to judge the evidence and the demeanor of 
the witnesses at trial.  Even if we ignore the disadvantages faced by an 
appellate court in its cold record review of the proceedings below, and 
assume that appellate judges are on par with juries in their ability to judge 
facts, “[a]n appellate court defies common sense when it steps out of its 
traditional role as a reviewing court and attempts to operate as a primary 
factfinder.”164  Indeed, even if we believed that appellate judges would be 
more competent as fact-finders than are juries,165 many have argued that it 
is simply not the role of the appellate court to serve as the arbiter of facts.166  
Permitting appellate judges to first-guess juries rather than demanding that 
convictions be automatically reversed betrays a preference for judges over 
juries, a preference the Constitution rejects. 
In addition, the jury’s role as an overseer of the judiciary is compromised 
when the trial court can prevent the jury from making a finding assigned to 
it under the Constitution and the appellate court can first-guess what that 
jury would have done.  Juries were assigned their institutional role by 
 
 164. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 429. 
 165. Id. at 430 (“We are probably better off with juries making ‘wrong’ decisions than 
with judges making ‘right’ ones.”); see also id. at n.95 (“[T]he value in citizen participation 
may outweigh the value of a decisionmaking system which makes more correct decisions.  
In the law generally, and in criminal law particularly, the societal acceptability of the 
decision may be more important than its correctness.  Juries represent an institutional 
insurance policy for the continued acceptability of the decisionmaking system.”). 
 166. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“[T]he jury trial provisions in 
the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of 
official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen 
to one judge or to a group of judges.”); Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1357 (“When appellate 
courts engage in review of the trial record to arrive at their own, independent judgments of 
guilt and innocence, they intrude upon the central function of the jury.”). 
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design.167  As discussed above, they represent the popular control of the 
judiciary, in the same way the ballot and franchise represent popular control 
of the executive and legislative branches.168  First-guessing the jury on 
harmless error review of omitted element errors is tantamount to canceling 
an election and installing the candidate who had been leading in the opinion 
polls. 
Taking away even one element from the jury’s consideration 
unacceptably mutes its community voice and undermines its structural 
role.169  The enforcement of the criminal law is undergirded by the moral 
preferences of the community.  As discussed above, the jury plays an 
indispensable role in expressing the moral judgment of those subject to the 
criminal laws.  Diluting the fact-finding function of the jury through first-
guessing diminishes that voice of the community.  Also, when jurors are 
misinstructed regarding the elements of the crimes charged, they are not 
fully participating in the democratic and civic education envisioned by the 
framers as part of the jury’s function. 
When an element of fact-finding is removed from the jury’s 
consideration, the jury’s capacity to engage in its mercy or nullification 
function also may be affected.  Deliberation over a factual finding the jury 
has been instructed to make could prompt consideration of leniency under 
the circumstances.  For example, if an intent element is omitted from a jury 
instruction, the jury may convict without the same level of consideration of 
the defendant’s motive and its impact on the determination of whether 
mercy should be shown.  Furthermore, criminal laws are defined by their 
elements, and a central function of jury nullification is to register the jury’s 
disapproval of the wisdom of a criminal law.  Jurors are hampered in this 
function if such laws are not fully defined for them.  Although nullification, 
understandably, is not universally considered a legitimate exercise of jury 
discretion,170 it is, as discussed above, an ancient aspect of the jury’s 
 
 167. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 136, at 794–97. 
 168. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 169. The Article III rationale for the structural cast of the federal jury does not, of course, 
apply to state juries, although the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause, 
which amplified the Article III Jury Trial Clause, may lend support for the identical 
treatment of missing elements errors on the state and federal level.  Certainly, the jury’s role 
as voice of the community carries the same importance in both the state and federal system.  
Further, as Justice Stevens reminded in Neder, the jury plays an additional protective role in 
states where judges are elected, or otherwise lack life tenure. “[T]his Court has not been 
properly sensitive to the importance of protecting the right to have a jury resolve critical 
issues of fact when there is a special danger that elected judges may listen to the voices of 
voters rather than witnesses.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 28 (1999) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Thus, an automatic reversal rule 
premised upon the institutional legitimacy of the jury may apply with equal force to missing 
element verdicts rendered by state juries. 
 170. Compare, e.g., Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification:  Law Versus Anarchy, 
31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1997), and Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 
Va. L. Rev. 253 (1996), with Butler, supra note 148, and Jack B. Weinstein, Considering 
Jury “Nullification”:  When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 239 (1993); see also Teresa L. Conaway et al., Jury Nullification:  A Selective, 
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prerogative.  The jury’s discretion to engage in this mercy function may be 
negatively impacted by first-guessing. 
Juries implement constitutional structure and serve as an important 
conduit for citizen influence on the criminal justice process and government 
generally.  The rationale for applying harmless error review to elemental 
omissions has focused exclusively on the interests of the individual criminal 
defendant.  Those interests, the Court has concluded, are overridden by 
concerns of efficiency, finality, and truth promotion.171  As a result, 
elemental omission, like so many other constitutional errors, can be 
harmless.  However, when we shift focus from the jury trial right of the 
individual criminal defendant to the institutional interests of the jury itself, 
the rationale for excluding elemental omissions from the category of 
structural error is substantially weakened.  Even an elemental omission 
error deemed harmless to the defendant is anything but harmless to the jury 
itself. 
The core jury function and prerogative of determining whether an 
accused is criminally liable under the terms of a statute is undermined when 
that jury is frustrated in that task.  When an uninformed or misinformed 
jury returns a verdict of guilty, it is not only the criminal defendant who 
suffers harm (whether or not the appellate court believes such defendant has 
been prejudiced), but the jury itself.  The only way to remedy and deter 
such injury to the jury is to treat such errors as structural error and 
automatically reverse convictions based upon fewer than all the elements of 
the charged crime. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITATIONS OF TREATING ELEMENTAL 
OMISSIONS AS STRUCTURAL ERROR 
While the institutional interests of the jury, as this Article argues, 
mandate automatic reversal for omitted elements verdicts, significant 
consequences may flow from this course of action.  Chief among the 
concerns with automatic reversal, both generally and in this specific 
context, are efficiency, fairness, finality, and public confidence in the 
administration of criminal justice.  In addition, critics may question how 
far-reaching such a rule would be.  Would it apply on plain error review, the 
standard of review which governs when the defendant fails to object at 
trial?  What is the danger that the rationale underlying such a rule 
eventually would lead to automatic reversal of all jury-related errors?  Is 
there any rational limiting principle available to rein in the effect of the 
application of an automatic reversal rule to missing elements verdicts?  This 
part provides some insight on the consequences of the position that a 
missing elements error can never be harmless and addresses normative 
concerns. 
 
Annotated Bibliography, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 393 (2004) (listing scores of articles and other 
commentary debating the merits of petit jury nullification). 
 171. See supra Part II.B; see also infra Part IV.A. 
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A.  Pragmatic Objections to Automatic Reversal  
of Elemental Omission Errors 
The early twentieth-century criminal procedure reform movement sought 
the adoption of a harmless error rule in order to 
substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to preserve review 
as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at 
the same time to make the process perform that function without giving 
men fairly convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid 
and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in relation to 
procedure, will engender and reflect in a printed record.172 
Although “[t]he power of appellate courts to set aside lower court verdicts 
is of crucial importance to the administration of justice,”173 underpinning 
the critique of a strict automatic reversal scheme is a desire for efficiency, 
fairness, finality, and public confidence in the administration of criminal 
justice.  While these pragmatic objections warrant a cautious approach to 
implementing what might appear to be a formalistic rule, none of them 
militates against exempting missing elements errors from harmless error 
review. 
1.  Efficiency 
Efficiency was a central complaint of those early twentieth-century 
reformers sponsoring the adoption of the harmless error rule in America, 
and the preservation of strained adjudication resources remains a key 
rationale for the halting expansion of the category of structural error.  To be 
sure, there are tremendous costs attendant to the reversal of a conviction.  
Pretermitting the emotional costs of, and challenges to, obtaining a 
conviction, the time and expense of a new trial exacts a significant cost on 
the system.  The marshaling and corralling of witnesses, the utilization of 
the finite time and focus of prosecutors and investigators, and the 
occupation of crowded trial court dockets all result from the reversal of a 
conviction. 
On the other hand, the institutional principles at stake overshadow 
concerns of efficiency.  As the Court recently stated in Blakely v. 
Washington, 
Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by 
jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice.  One can 
certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving 
justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of the world, 
particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just that course.  
There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm 
for criminal justice:  not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, 
 
 172. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946). 
 173. Simon, supra note 2, at 575. 
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but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict 
division of authority between judge and jury.174 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the application of harmless error is the 
more efficient of the approaches to reviewing elemental omission errors.175  
A strict rule of automatic reversal obviously will reduce the amount of time 
a case will occupy appellate dockets.  Where an appellate court determines 
that a jury was not properly instructed on all the elements of the crime,176 it 
simply would reverse the conviction without proceeding to the question of 
prejudice to the defendant and without stepping into the shoes of the jury to 
attempt to determine what it would have done had it been properly 
instructed.  Thus, a rule of automatic reversal would obviate the need for 
the time-intensive analysis of the trial court record that is necessary to the 
appellate court’s application of harmless error review.  Furthermore, under 
a regime of automatic reversal, both trial courts and prosecutors would be 
especially vigilant in ensuring that juries are properly instructed with regard 
to the elements of the charged offenses.  Because the appellate remedy of 
reversal would be swift and sure, special attention would be paid to this 
crucial jury instruction.  Granted, no amount of care will avoid the error 
where the trial court is following binding circuit precedent in delivering 
jury instructions and such precedent is modified or overruled prior to 
appeal.  However, where jury instruction error can be avoided, the incentive 
to the government and the court to correct it will be significant. 
2.  Fairness 
Fairness is another central concern implicated by an automatic reversal 
rule for missing element verdicts.  The cluster of due process protections for 
the defendant is a prominent, but not the exclusive, locus for expectations 
of fairness in the criminal justice system.  The government, which carries 
the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt, is entitled, of course, to 
 
 174. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004). 
 175. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 440–41 (arguing that the harmless constitutional 
error rule adds to court congestion and is not clearly supportive of efficiency at the appellate 
level). 
 176. The majority in Neder asserted that the exemption of omitted elements errors from 
harmless error review would require federal courts not only to expend great effort to analyze 
the elements of myriad federal statutes, but also would require federal courts on habeas 
review “to ascertain the elements of the offense as defined in the laws of 50 different States.” 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (“Difficult as such issues would be when 
dealing with the ample volume defining federal crimes, they would be measurably 
compounded by the necessity for federal courts, reviewing state convictions under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, to ascertain the elements of the offense as defined in the laws of 50 different 
States.”).  While this may be true, determining that a missing elements state verdict violates 
the Sixth Amendment under a harmless error regime also requires a consideration of 
elements of state statutes.  In any event, it should be of no moment that courts may 
experience a slightly increased workload in order to safeguard the institutional interest of the 
jury, the purpose of which is “to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or 
abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction.” United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977). 
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evenhanded treatment by the courts.  In cases where the government 
presents evidence that it believes would have convinced a properly 
instructed jury on every element of the crime, the reversal of a conviction 
on account of a missing element seems a harsh result.  As described above, 
missing elements verdicts can arise from a number of scenarios.  Where the 
trial court simply overlooks or misdescribes a required jury instruction and 
the government fails to catch the error or declines to notice the omission, 
reversal seems to run with the equities.  However, where the jury 
instruction was in compliance with binding precedent when given, and only 
later deemed erroneous, fairness might seem to militate against reversal 
where no prejudice to the defendant can be shown.  Likewise, the public 
may view reversals of missing element convictions where no prejudice to 
the defendant has resulted as undermining fairness in the system. 
However, automatic reversal is a deterrent to future individual rights and 
structural constitutional violations in the trial court.177  Despite perceptions 
of fairness (or lack thereof) which might be held by prosecutors and the 
public related to the proposed remedy, the purpose of treating missing 
elements errors as reversible per se is that the preservation of the 
institutional integrity of the jury should not rest on the government’s views 
of the strength of its own evidence.  In the same vein, popular sentiment 
about the equities in a given case cannot distract courts from fidelity to 
important structural and instructional requirements.178  In the end, fairness 
in the criminal justice system is most effectively safeguarded by a jury 
permitted to perform its constitutionally assigned function of finding guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt on all the elements of the crime. 
3.  Finality 
There is, of course, inherent value in finality in the criminal process.179  
Finality is crucial because it undergirds the effective functioning of the 
criminal process.  From a crime control perspective, finality in criminal 
litigation gives law enforcement officers and prosecutors the credibility 
with witnesses necessary to keep the system functional.  Certainty in the 
disposition of criminal cases is important not only to the repeat players in 
the system, but also to the victims of criminal conduct.  Unending criminal 
proceedings can delay the healing process and frustrate efforts at restorative 
justice.  Furthermore, criminal defendants have an interest in finality in 
criminal proceedings.  Indeed, the Constitution’s assurance that the serious 
 
 177. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 
Conn. L. Rev. 243, 299–300 (2000); Simon, supra note 2, at 580 (“[A]ppellate reversals 
serve important constitutional functions by condemning the infringement of the defendant’s 
rights; educating police investigators, prosecutors, and trial judges; and deterring them from 
future violations.”). 
 178. Cf. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (“Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to 
what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice.”). 
 179. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452–53 (1963). 
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collateral consequences of criminal jeopardy cannot be revisited upon a 
criminal defendant after an acquittal—no matter how ill-founded the fact-
finder’s decision—is grounded in notions of finality.180  Many undoubtedly 
share the expectation that the jury, for better or worse, will have the final 
word on guilt or innocence.  Although appellate proceedings related to 
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors in the adjudicative process are 
commonplace, arguably the determination of whether the government has 
met its burden of proof on all elements of the crime should end with the 
fact-finder. 
However, the system tolerates (and even requires) the review of the 
factual basis for jury convictions by the trial court under postverdict 
motions for judgment of acquittal on evidentiary sufficiency grounds,181 
and by the appellate court in the course of sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges.  In those situations, the jury presumably has been properly 
instructed and has reached the conclusion that the government has met its 
burden of proof on all required elements.  Nevertheless, the reviewing trial 
or appellate court can determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”182  
Juries, for better or worse, sometimes do not have the final word on a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.183  With appellate first-guessing of omitted 
elements verdicts, juries do not have the first word either. 
4.  Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System 
The inclusion of missing element errors in the category of structural error 
also may lead to apprehension that automatic reversals in such cases will 
undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system.  Indeed, the 
restoration of public confidence in the criminal process in the wake of well-
publicized reversals was the rallying cry for the reform efforts leading to the 
adoption of the harmless error rule.184  However, it is important to 
remember that treating missing elements as structural error only affords the 
defendant a new trial, not outright acquittal.  Therefore, the “guilty” are not 
 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978) (“‘The underlying idea [of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause] . . . is that the State with all its resources and power should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty.’” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 
187–88 (1957)). 
 181. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 (motion for judgment of acquittal); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
33 (motion for new trial, which may be granted on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence if the court believes that it is in the interest of justice). 
 182. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 183. To be sure, judicial interference with a jury’s guilty verdict pursuant to Rule 29 
undoubtedly infringes upon jury discretion, but it does so in the service of due process 
protections for the defendant.  The application of harmless error review to the first-guessing 
described in this Article undermines both jury discretion and due process protections. 
 184. See supra Part I.A. 
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going free; all the automatic reversal rule requires is that the accused 
receive a trial before a jury properly instructed that it needs to find every 
element of the crime in order to convict.  In most cases, the government 
will have a second opportunity to try the defendant and seek a conviction.  
Rather than undermining public confidence in the system, the care the 
system takes to ensure that individuals are not deprived of life or liberty 
without the requisite safeguards would seem to have the opposite effect.  So 
too would the outward show of the courts’ commitment to the institution of 
the jury, a cornerstone of the criminal justice system and conduit for public 
participation in that system. 
That the jury’s institutional interests are sometimes at odds with other 
important values in the criminal justice process comes as no surprise.  
Recognized for the manner in which it serves important pragmatic interests 
as well as the promotion of truth in the criminal justice process, the 
harmless error rule has survived criticism that it intrudes upon the province 
of the jury.185  Nevertheless, where the intrusion undermines the structural 
and institutional legitimacy of the jury, automatic reversal is warranted and 
worth its concomitant efficiency costs. 
B.  Migration to Other Jury-Related Errors? 
There is a legitimate concern that designating missing elements verdicts 
as structural error based on the institutional injury to the jury will lead to a 
rapid expansion of the number of jury-related errors subject to automatic 
reversal.  This slippery slope argument has some merit, but only with regard 
to errors that undermine the institutional role of the jury.186  The type of 
errors implicating the structural role of the jury—like the erroneous 
reasonable doubt instruction deemed to be structural error in Sullivan v. 
Louisiana187—might include, for instance, verdicts rendered by a jury 
smaller than deemed consistent with the constitutional guarantee, or an 
error allowing a biased or interested jury to render a verdict in a case.188  
 
 185. See generally, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6. 
 186. Therefore, for example, an error that involved a verdict from a jury of five members 
might compromise the jury’s institutional interest in engaging in deliberation and serving as 
the voice of the community in a way that improper prosecutorial comment to the jury might 
not. 
 187. 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
 188. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause is 
violated when a prosecutor challenges a potential juror on the basis of race or on race-based 
assumptions regarding the ability of a potential juror to judge a member of her own race. See 
476 U.S. 79, 89–96 (1986).  Although the issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, 
lower courts have overwhelmingly treated Batson errors as structural error. See United States 
v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[The] suggestion [that Batson errors 
are amenable to harmless error review] has been resoundingly rejected by every circuit court 
that has considered the issue.”) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 
580, 588 (6th Cir. 1999); Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997).  But 
see Carter v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting lower court disagreement on 
the application of the harmless error rule when a Batson error improperly excluded an 
alternate juror but no alternate was ultimately deliberated).  Although the injury in a 
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Because such errors go to the very essence of the jury’s identity and 
function, they conceivably could be candidates for automatic reversal if 
harmless error review would undermine those institutional interests. 
Regardless of these slippery slope concerns, the Court’s jurisprudence is 
trending away from any expansion of the structural error exception to 
harmless error review, toward the continued subordination of the 
institutional interests of the jury.  One prominent example can be found in 
the recent application of harmless error review to Blakely error in 
Washington v. Recuenco.189  The Court has drastically expanded (some 
would argue restored) the Sixth Amendment jury trial right by requiring 
that all facts required for sentence enhancement be proven to a jury (rather 
than a judge) beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of 
the evidence.190  The line of cases, beginning with Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,191 was greeted with much fanfare and academic commentary.  The 
consensus was that, no matter the everyday practical effect of the decisions, 
the Supreme Court had made a significant nod to the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial and the institution of the jury itself.192  Nevertheless, the 
Recuenco Court recently decided that the sentencing court’s failure to 
adhere to Blakely’s strictures was subject to harmless error review.193  
Thus, even where the sentencing court explicitly invades the province of the 
jury in setting a sentence, the Court uses prejudice to the individual 
defendant as the sole touchstone for determining whether such invasion 
deserves a remedy.  Recuenco is but another example of the application of 
the harmless error rule to errors implicating the institutional interests of the 
jury. 
Neder and Recuenco are both harbingers of the migration of the 
subordination of the jury’s institutional interests to the context of the grand 
jury as well.  In the October 2006 Term, in United States v. Resendiz-
Ponce,194 the Court took up the question whether harmless error should 
apply where an indictment fails to charge all the elements of a crime.  In 
Resendiz-Ponce, the defendant had been charged with attempted illegal 
reentry after deportation.195  Although he was convicted at trial by a jury 
 
violation of Batson is to the defendant’s right to equal protection, one might also conceive of 
it as relevant to the makeup of the jury in its role as voice of the community, and thus 
injurious to the institutional interest of the jury. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson 
Paradox:  Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale L.J. 93, 
137–38 (1996). 
 189. 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006). 
 190. See id. at 2549. 
 191. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 192. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Apprendi’s Aftermath, 15 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 
75 (2002); Bilionis, supra note 155, at 1354; Saltzburg, supra note 17.  But see Bibas, supra 
note 155, at 465–66 (“The real tug of war [in the ‘institutional allocation of power in the 
criminal justice system’ related to Apprendi] is not between juries and judges, as there are 
few juries left, but among prosecutors, legislatures, and judges.”). 
 193. See Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2552–53. 
 194. 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007). 
 195. Id. at 786–87. 
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properly instructed on each element of the crime, the grand jury arguably 
had been instructed on fewer than all the elements of the crime.196  The 
solicitor general argued that, like in Neder, the failure to instruct the fact-
finder on all elements of the offense is not a structural error requiring 
automatic reversal.197  Because the right to grand jury has not been 
incorporated, elemental omission in the grand jury context presented an 
even weaker case than elemental omission in the jury trial context, which 
had been determined, in Neder, not to be structural error.198  Instead, the 
United States argued, the error should be subject to harmless error review, 
with the inquiry on appeal being “whether it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, but for the error, the grand jury would still have returned an 
indictment” considering the evidence presented at trial.199  The government 
contended that where a properly instructed petit jury subsequently renders a 
verdict of guilty on all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt—a 
higher standard of proof than the grand jury’s probable cause inquiry200—
the error does not prejudice the defendant.201 
The government’s position in Resendiz-Ponce ignored the grand jury’s 
structural and institutional legitimacy; the grand jury plays a structural role 
which implements constitutional design.202  A preconstitutional entity, the 
grand jury, like the petit jury, works as both a conduit to express 
community values and as a structural check on the three branches of 
government.203  The grand jury is in a unique position to offer feedback on 
the wisdom of the substance, application, and adjudication of the criminal 
 
 196. See id. at 787.  Juan Resendiz-Ponce argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit agreed, that attempted illegal reentry required an overt act, an allegation not 
included in the indictment. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729, 731–32 (9th 
Cir. 2005).  The Supreme Court ultimately would disagree that an overt act was required to 
be explicitly included in the indictment. See Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. at 789–80. 
 197. Brief for the United States at 9–23, Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782 (No. 05-998). 
 198. Id. at 15.  It is unclear why the fact that the Supreme Court, in Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516 (1884), did not incorporate the Grand Jury Clause through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states would have any bearing on 
whether, in a federal prosecution, a grand jury indictment on all elements of the charged 
offense is required. 
 199. See Brief for the United States, supra note 197, at 9. 
 200. Id.  It is ironic that the United States relied upon the subsequent jury verdict as 
cleansing the elemental omission error in the grand jury, particularly when the government 
would have harmless error apply to elemental omissions in the petit jury context as well 
under Neder. 
 201. Id.  Of course, the prejudice to the defendant is an inquiry under harmless error 
review, not a rationale for applying it.  The position of the United States does find some 
support in United States v. Mechanik, where the Court concluded that the subsequent 
conviction by a petit jury renders harmless procedural errors in the grand jury. 475 U.S. 66, 
67 (1986).  See generally, e.g., Christopher M. Arfaa, Note, Mechanikal Applications of the 
Harmless Error Rule in Cases of Prosecutorial Grand Jury Misconduct, 1988 Duke L.J. 
1242.  Nevertheless, the error at issue in Resendiz-Ponce is not merely procedural, but goes 
to the heart of the grand jury’s institutional and structural role. 
 202. See Fairfax, supra note 149 (manuscript at 122, on file with author). 
 203. See id. (manuscript at 121–23, on file with author). 
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law.204  Thought for most of our constitutional history to be so important as 
to serve as a prerequisite to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in a criminal 
case,205 the grand jury has a rich heritage with its own constitutional 
purpose and with institutional interests independent from those of the 
criminal defendant.206  All this is ignored in the suggestion that harmless 
error review should apply to elemental omission errors in grand jury 
indictment. 
In the end, the Court in Resendiz-Ponce avoided the question whether 
elemental omissions in the grand jury context were structural errors,207 but 
the issue is sure to present itself to the Court in the very near future.208  
Some have suggested that the solicitor general is correct in the argument 
that Neder dictates the answer to the question.209  However, the same 
institutional interests involved with elemental omissions in the petit jury 
context are at stake in the grand jury context.  The grand jury’s existence 
and purpose are not completely tethered to the role of vehicle for the 
individual rights of a criminal defendant.  When an appellate court 
determines what the grand jury would have done had it been asked to do 
so,210 it substitutes its judgment for that of the grand jury, the entity to 
which the Constitution assigns the indictment function.  If the grand jury is 
to continue to have constitutional or practical import, its institutional 
 
 204. See id. (manuscript at 144, on file with author).  Indeed, during oral argument in 
Resendiz-Ponce, Chief Justice John Roberts seemed to pay fealty to the grand jury’s 
institutional and structural interests when he stated that “historically a significant role for the 
grand jury has been not to indict people even though the government had the evidence to 
indict them.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. 
Ct. 782 (2007) (No. 05-998). 
 205. See Fairfax, supra note 162, at 399–400.  The Court, in United States v. Cotton, 
questioned the jurisdictional import of grand jury indictment. 535 U.S. 625, 629–31 (2002); 
see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield, To Err Is Human:  The Judicial Conundrum of Curing 
Apprendi Error, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 889, 951–53 (2003) (discussing Cotton). 
 206. See generally Fairfax, supra note 162. 
 207. See supra note 200. 
 208. In oral argument in Resendiz-Ponce, the Government argued that the sheer volume 
of federal criminal cases, the opportunity for both prosecutors and judges to make mistakes, 
and the prospect of case law developments subsequent to the securing of indictments mean 
that the issue of elemental omissions will arise frequently. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 204, at 15–16. 
 209. One commentator has reasoned that Neder would also necessitate the application of 
harmless error to instances where the grand jury has indicted on fewer than all the elements 
of a crime. See Fairfield, supra note 205, at 951–53 (arguing that Neder’s logic should 
extend to failure to present an element of a crime to a grand jury).  As for the thinking of 
Justice Scalia, the vigorous dissenter in Neder, we have a strong “clue” from his dissent in 
Resendiz-Ponce:  “Since the full Court will undoubtedly have to speak to the point on 
another day (it dodged the bullet today by inviting and deciding a different constitutional 
issue—albeit, to be fair, a narrower one) there is little use in my setting forth my views in 
detail.  It should come as no surprise, given my opinions in [United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564 (2006) (holding that the right to choice of counsel is structural 
error), and Neder] that I would find the error to be structural.”  United States v. Resendiz-
Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782, 793 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 210. See, e.g., Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633 (“Surely the grand jury, having found that the 
conspiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of 
cocaine base.”). 
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legitimacy must not be undermined in the very serious way that harmless 
error review of elemental omission or first-guessing threatens to undermine 
it.  As in the petit jury context, elemental omission in the grand jury context 
should be treated as structural error. 
C.  Limiting Principles? 
Although the structural and institutional interests of the jury necessitate 
the treatment of missing elements verdicts as structural error, query whether 
there are limiting principles to cabin the cost and disruption the automatic 
reversal rule would cause while remaining true to the underlying rationale.  
Two such limiting principles are considered below and ultimately rejected 
because they are inconsistent with the institutional interests of the jury. 
One possible limit on the rule might confine it to those missing elements 
verdicts where substantive, factual elements are missing from the jury 
instruction.  For example, where a jury instruction—through omission, 
misdescription, or erroneous mandatory presumption—is missing the intent 
element, the rule of automatic reversal would apply, whereas, for example, 
in a federal bank robbery case, a missing element that a robbed bank had 
been federally insured could be subject to harmless error review.  Some 
courts have drawn distinctions between “substantive” elements and merely 
“procedural” or “technical” elements.211  The problem with this approach is 
that it is not clear which elements are technical and which are not.  Is the 
element that requires a finding that a firearm traveled in interstate 
commerce a technical element?  Does it matter that the element is related to 
Congress’s power to proscribe the conduct in the first place?  Whenever the 
legislature sees fit to require an elemental finding in its definition of the 
crime, it is unclear the extent to which it can be determined whether the 
element is substantive or procedural.  Furthermore, the Jury Clauses, due 
process, and common law tradition require that the jury find evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the crime charged, not just 
nontechnical elements.212  The jury’s institutional interest would seem to be 
undermined when any required factual finding is taken from it and given to 
the court. 
Related to the technical/substantive approach is one that would limit the 
rule of automatic reversal to elements where the evidence was controverted.  
Some courts have equated such elements with technical elements,213 and 
others have suggested that the fact that the element had been disputed by 
 
 211. See Glenn v. Dallman, 686 F.2d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1982); see also United States 
v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 921 (6th Cir. 1972) (“We are not here concerned with an omission 
that constitutes a mere technical defect or with one that concerns the existence of an element 
that has been conceded by the defense or is otherwise not in issue.  Instead, the omission in 
this case concerned the element that constitutes the very basis of the offense and the only 
element in issue.”); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 1968) (finding that 
reversal was warranted where “omission was not merely a technical procedural fault but 
could have visited substantial prejudice on [the defendant]”). 
 212. See, e.g., Greabe, supra note 11, at 847. 
 213. See, e.g., Bryant,  461 F.2d at 920–21. 
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the defendant would be a factor in determining whether automatic reversal 
would apply.  Indeed, as some have argued, Neder could be interpreted to 
allow for automatic reversal where the misdescribed element was contested 
and the evidence was, in the view of the appellate court, more equivocal.214  
Although this is a reasonable reading of Neder,215 the Court’s opinion 
states, in the broadest possible terms, that “omission of an element is an 
error that is subject to harmless-error analysis.”216 
Even if there were room in the Court’s holding for a “partial” automatic 
reversal rule, applying when an element had been contested at trial, the 
appellate determination of whether evidence was controverted would 
require an intensive record review that would resemble the prejudice 
inquiry under harmless error review.  Furthermore, it would seem odd to 
condition the application of the automatic reversal rule on an appellate 
review of the record to determine the extent to which the appellate court 
believes the defendant disputed the government’s evidence on an element, 
particularly given that the defendant has no burden of proof and is not 
required to put on a defense.217 
As the Court underscored in Neder, “Under our cases, a constitutional 
error is either structural or it is not.”218  If the jury’s structural and 
institutional interests are to be safeguarded through the characterization of 
missing elements verdicts as structural error, then the protective remedy of 
automatic reversal ought to apply across the board. 
Mandating automatic reversal in cases where the defendant did not object 
below, however, presents more difficult issues.  Where there was no 
defense objection at the jury instruction stage, the defendant could have 
been sandbagging the prosecution by failing to note the error in hopes of an 
acquittal.  It goes without saying that such gamesmanship is abusive of the 
 
 214. See Carter, supra note 129, at 240 (“The Court’s carefully limited holding . . . leaves 
open room for an argument that an erroneously omitted element of a crime would only be 
harmless if the element were uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.  The 
opinion further allows for the position that contesting the element at trial or on appeal would 
be sufficient to establish the harm.”). 
 215. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (noting that the defendant had not 
contested the materiality element at trial and did not suggest that the element would be 
contested on retrial); see also id. at 19 (“In a case such as this one, where a defendant did 
not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the 
question whether the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error does not 
fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee.”); United States v. King, 
587 F.2d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The failure to instruct on every element of an offense is 
harmless error only if the omitted element is undisputed, and, therefore, its omission could 
not possibly have been prejudicial.”). 
 216. Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. 
 217. See id. at 19 (“Of course, safeguarding the jury guarantee will often require that a 
reviewing court conduct a thorough examination of the record.  If, at the end of that 
examination, the court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict 
would have been the same absent the error—for example, where the defendant contested the 
omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding—it should not 
find the error harmless.”). 
 218. Id. at 14. 
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criminal process and should be discouraged.219  However, the institutional 
interests of the jury apply with equal force whether or not defendant’s 
counsel noticed the error below; because it is the jury (as well as the 
defendant) that is injured by missing elements verdicts, automatic reversal 
should be applied.220 
Federal plain error review, a much more onerous standard of review than 
that of harmless error, focuses its inquiry on four key factors.  The 
defendant has the burden of showing that there was an error, that the error 
was “plain,” that it “affect[s] substantial rights,”221 and that it “‘seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”222  Although demonstration of prejudice typically is required 
to satisfy the “affect[s] substantial rights” prong of the plain error rule, the 
Supreme Court has not foreclosed the notion that “[t]here may be a special 
category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of their effect 
on the outcome.”223  The Court’s subsequent statements on this issue are 
not the model of clarity, but a fair reading of the Court’s approach is that 
the fact that an error was a structural error for purposes of harmless error 
review meant that it likely would satisfy the third, “affect[s] substantial 
 
 219. Of course, such strategic behavior is only effective where both the judge and the 
prosecutor fail to notice the error in the jury instruction about which defense counsel stood 
silent.  An automatic reversal approach would incentivize trial courts and prosecutors, thus 
diminishing the incidence of erroneous jury instructions. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 220. Cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“If [elemental omissions] were, as Justice Scalia’s dissent suggests, as serious as 
malpractice on ‘the spinal column of American democracy,’ surely the error would require 
reversal of the conviction regardless of whether defense counsel made a timely objection.” 
(citations omitted)).  A colorable argument can be made that, just as we tolerate the 
defendant’s waiver of rights affecting the jury’s institutional interests (such as in the guilty 
plea context), see supra note 162, we should be willing to countenance the application of 
harmless error review where the defendant has forfeited the issue below. Cf. Freytag v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 892–901 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 894 n.2 (highlighting the distinction between 
“waiver” and “forfeiture” and noting that “[a] right that cannot be waived cannot be forfeited 
by other means (at least in the same proceeding), but the converse is not true”).  This may be 
particularly so in a situation where the defendant has not merely failed to object to an 
elemental omission error in the trial court’s jury instructions, but has contributed to the error 
by submitting proposed jury instructions which omit a required element of an offense.  
Under a regime of automatic reversal for elemental omission error, as this Article submits, 
prosecutors and judges will have a strong incentive to ensure defendants do not game the 
system in this way.  However, to the extent a line must be drawn for the purpose of 
constraining appellate remedies in the forfeiture context, perhaps a defendant’s affirmative 
manufacturing of elemental omission error would be an appropriate place to draw it. 
 221. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 (1993).  Rule 52(b) generally is 
permissive; these four prongs must be satisfied simply to trigger the reviewing court’s 
remedial discretion to correct the error under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1997); see also Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 30(d) (naming plain error review under Rule 52(b) as the exclusive means of access 
to appellate review of forfeited jury instruction error). 
 222. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736–37 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936)). 
 223. Id. at 735. 
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rights,” prong of the plain error test.224  However, what is clear is that the 
Court has been unwilling to treat elemental omission as the type of error 
that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings” (the fourth prong of the plain error test), such that a 
court may exercise discretion to correct it.225  The Court, in rejecting the 
notion that failure to submit an element of the crime to a jury was an error 
so serious as to cast doubt on judicial proceedings sufficient to trigger 
correction of a plain error, will assess the amount of uncontroverted 
evidence presented by the government—the same analysis employed under 
harmless error review of elemental omissions.226 
The application of this brand of plain error review to missing elements 
verdicts undoubtedly avoids the necessity of costly retrials under the 
automatic reversal rule.  Nonetheless, this approach, though in service of 
the pragmatic interests discussed above, ignores the institutional 
significance of the jury.  Only the categorization of missing elements 
verdicts as structural error fully safeguards the institutional role of the jury 
and shores up the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
By usurping the jury’s core fact-finding function through harmless error 
review of elemental omissions, appellate courts undermine the jury’s 
structural and institutional role of injecting popular input into the judicial 
function.  Notwithstanding the pragmatic benefits that might flow from 
allowing appellate judges to substitute their judgment of the facts for that of 
the jury, “first-guessing” works a fundamental intrusion into the province of 
the jury.  Once the prerogative of the jury has been breached in this way, 
there is no principled way to prevent further infringements. 
In its refusal to treat elemental omission error as structural and, therefore, 
reversible per se, the Court has operated under far too cramped a conception 
of the constitutional injury involved.  The Court has demonstrated its 
willingness to sacrifice vindication of Sixth Amendment jury trial rights at 
the altar of the pragmatic values the harmless error rule advances.  The 
Court’s approach, while merely misguided with regard to the constitutional 
injury to individual criminal defendants caused by harmless error review of 
elemental omission errors, is laid bare as wholly untenable once the focus is 
shifted to the institutional injury suffered by the jury itself.  Fidelity to the 
constitutional and democratic ideals undergirding the institution of the jury 
requires that the category of structural errors not susceptible to harmless 
error review be expanded to include elemental omission error. 
 
 224. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002) (seeming to assume that 
a structural error would satisfy the third prong of the plain error analysis); Johnson, 520 U.S. 
at 468–69 (discussing, but not deciding, whether a structural error satisfied the third prong of 
the plain error test). 
 225. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70 (citation omitted). 
 226. See id. at 470 & n.2. 
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The harmless error rule, a twentieth century innovation of statute and 
constitutional common law, was designed to eschew formalism in favor of 
adherence to pragmatism.  Nevertheless, the reach of the harmless error rule 
was meant to extend only as far as the boundaries of basic constitutional 
values would permit.  No constitutional value is more fundamental than the 
framework of government that shelters the political and civil rights we hold 
so dearly.  The jury’s institutional role in that structure must be jealously 
guarded, lest our desire for efficiency overshadow our need for liberty. 
